diff mbox

msix: fix msix_vector_masked

Message ID alpine.DEB.2.02.1602151009090.27008@kaball.uk.xensource.com
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Stefano Stabellini Feb. 15, 2016, 10:15 a.m. UTC
On Sat, 13 Feb 2016, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen")
> inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally.
> Limit it to only when xen is enabled.
> Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log
> since the format is pci little-endian.
> 
> Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>

Thanks Daniel for finding the issue and thanks Michael for fixing my
bug, sorry about that.


>  hw/pci/msix.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c
> index eb4ef11..537fdba 100644
> --- a/hw/pci/msix.c
> +++ b/hw/pci/msix.c
> @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
>  static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask)
>  {
>      unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
> -    uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
> +    uint8_t *data = &dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
>      /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
>       * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
> -    if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) {
> +    if (xen_enabled() && xen_is_pirq_msi(pci_get_long(data))) {
>          return false;
>      }
>      return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &

I think this is good, but moving the xen_enabled() check inside
xen_is_pirq_msi is even be better, so that we cover all call sites at
once.

Comments

Michael S. Tsirkin Feb. 15, 2016, 11:34 a.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Feb 15, 2016 at 10:15:12AM +0000, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Sat, 13 Feb 2016, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > commit 428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 ("fix MSI injection on Xen")
> > inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally.
> > Limit it to only when xen is enabled.
> > Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log
> > since the format is pci little-endian.
> > 
> > Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> 
> Thanks Daniel for finding the issue and thanks Michael for fixing my
> bug, sorry about that.
> 
> 
> >  hw/pci/msix.c | 4 ++--
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c
> > index eb4ef11..537fdba 100644
> > --- a/hw/pci/msix.c
> > +++ b/hw/pci/msix.c
> > @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
> >  static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask)
> >  {
> >      unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
> > -    uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
> > +    uint8_t *data = &dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
> >      /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
> >       * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
> > -    if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) {
> > +    if (xen_enabled() && xen_is_pirq_msi(pci_get_long(data))) {
> >          return false;
> >      }
> >      return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &
> 
> I think this is good, but moving the xen_enabled() check inside
> xen_is_pirq_msi is even be better, so that we cover all call sites at
> once.

Feel free to post a patch on top.

> 
> diff --git a/xen-hvm.c b/xen-hvm.c
> index 039680a..991f6b7 100644
> --- a/xen-hvm.c
> +++ b/xen-hvm.c
> @@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data)
>      /* If vector is 0, the msi is remapped into a pirq, passed as
>       * dest_id.
>       */
> -    return ((msi_data & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK) >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) == 0;
> +    return xen_enabled() &&
> +        ((msi_data & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK) >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) == 0;
>  }
>  
>  void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data)
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/xen-hvm.c b/xen-hvm.c
index 039680a..991f6b7 100644
--- a/xen-hvm.c
+++ b/xen-hvm.c
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@  int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data)
     /* If vector is 0, the msi is remapped into a pirq, passed as
      * dest_id.
      */
-    return ((msi_data & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK) >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) == 0;
+    return xen_enabled() &&
+        ((msi_data & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK) >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) == 0;
 }
 
 void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data)