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[3.13.y-ckt,stable] Patch "udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte characters" has been added to the 3.13.y-ckt tree

Message ID 1454373327-3674-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Kamal Mostafa Feb. 2, 2016, 12:35 a.m. UTC
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled

    udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte characters

to the linux-3.13.y-queue branch of the 3.13.y-ckt extended stable tree 
which can be found at:

    http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git/ubuntu/linux.git/log/?h=linux-3.13.y-queue

This patch is scheduled to be released in version 3.13.11-ckt34.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please 
reply to this email.

For more information about the 3.13.y-ckt tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable

Thanks.
-Kamal

---8<------------------------------------------------------------

From 590492f1d1934f6b111b122638dca1cc2adbbc48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Dec 2015 10:25:32 -0600
Subject: udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte characters

commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream.

udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer
length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length,
but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only,
while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing
buffer overflow.

Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts
the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed
length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2.

In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer
length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also
following allocation structures, causing kernel crash.

Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer
overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
---
 fs/udf/unicode.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--
1.9.1
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/fs/udf/unicode.c b/fs/udf/unicode.c
index d29c06f..dd8c24a 100644
--- a/fs/udf/unicode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/unicode.c
@@ -133,11 +133,15 @@  int udf_CS0toUTF8(struct ustr *utf_o, const struct ustr *ocu_i)
 		if (c < 0x80U)
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] = (uint8_t)c;
 		else if (c < 0x800U) {
+			if (utf_o->u_len > (UDF_NAME_LEN - 4))
+				break;
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
 						(uint8_t)(0xc0 | (c >> 6));
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
 						(uint8_t)(0x80 | (c & 0x3f));
 		} else {
+			if (utf_o->u_len > (UDF_NAME_LEN - 5))
+				break;
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
 						(uint8_t)(0xe0 | (c >> 12));
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
@@ -282,7 +286,7 @@  static int udf_CS0toNLS(struct nls_table *nls, struct ustr *utf_o,
 			c = (c << 8) | ocu[i++];

 		len = nls->uni2char(c, &utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len],
-				    UDF_NAME_LEN - utf_o->u_len);
+				    UDF_NAME_LEN - 2 - utf_o->u_len);
 		/* Valid character? */
 		if (len >= 0)
 			utf_o->u_len += len;