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[3.19.y-ckt,011/107] KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid

Message ID 1438811379-384-12-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Kamal Mostafa Aug. 5, 2015, 9:48 p.m. UTC 
3.19.8-ckt5 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>

commit ca4da5dd1f99fe9c59f1709fb43e818b18ad20e0 upstream.

__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().

The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can.  Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.

CVE-2015-1333

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
---
 security/keys/keyring.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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Patch

diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index e72548b..d334370 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1181,9 +1181,11 @@  void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
 	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring)
 		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
-	if (edit && !edit->dead_leaf) {
-		key_payload_reserve(keyring,
-				    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+	if (edit) {
+		if (!edit->dead_leaf) {
+			key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+				keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+		}
 		assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit);
 	}
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);