@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ static int xenvif_handle_frag_list(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *s
{
unsigned int offset = skb_headlen(skb);
skb_frag_t frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
- int i;
+ int i, f;
struct ubuf_info *uarg;
struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
@@ -1383,6 +1383,11 @@ static int xenvif_handle_frag_list(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *s
frags[i].page_offset = 0;
skb_frag_size_set(&frags[i], len);
}
+
+ /* Release all the original (foreign) frags. */
+ for (f = 0; f < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; f++)
+ skb_frag_unref(skb, f);
+
/* swap out with old one */
memcpy(skb_shinfo(skb)->frags,
frags,
Every time a VIF is destroyed up to 256 pages may be leaked if packets with more than MAX_SKB_FRAGS frags were transmitted from the guest. Even worse, if another user of ballooned pages allocated one of these ballooned pages it would not handle the unexpectedly >1 page count (e.g., gntdev would deadlock when unmapping a grant because the page count would never reach 1). When handling a from-guest skb with a frag list, unref the frags before releasing them so they are freed correctly when the VIF is destroyed. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)