| Message ID | 1413922153-24756-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 7e355bb..cd52609 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -326,8 +326,11 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, } /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ - if (method != JUST_CFM) + if (method != JUST_CFM) { set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->smp_flags); + if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) + hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; + } /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled Bluetooth: Fix setting correct security level when initiating SMP to the linux-3.13.y-queue branch of the 3.13.y.z extended stable tree which can be found at: http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.13.y-queue This patch is scheduled to be released in version 3.13.11.10. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please reply to this email. For more information about the 3.13.y.z tree, see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable Thanks. -Kamal ------ From a5c3576d285d5ca03171bc352bfbf2456c9d0440 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 11:26:32 +0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix setting correct security level when initiating SMP commit 5eb596f55cacc2389554a8d7572d90d5e9d4269d upstream. We can only determine the final security level when both pairing request and response have been exchanged. When initiating pairing the starting target security level is set to MEDIUM unless explicitly specified to be HIGH, so that we can still perform pairing even if the remote doesn't have MITM capabilities. However, once we've received the pairing response we should re-consult the remote and local IO capabilities and upgrade the target security level if necessary. Without this patch the resulting Long Term Key will occasionally be reported to be unauthenticated when it in reality is an authenticated one. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 1.9.1