diff mbox

[3.8.y.z,extended,stable] Patch "auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking" has been added to staging queue

Message ID 1405977705-2669-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Kamal Mostafa July 21, 2014, 9:21 p.m. UTC 
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled

    auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

to the linux-3.8.y-queue branch of the 3.8.y.z extended stable tree 
which can be found at:

 http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.8.y-queue

This patch is scheduled to be released in version 3.8.13.27.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please 
reply to this email.

For more information about the 3.8.y.z tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable

Thanks.
-Kamal

------

From 4da6072426263c77cb0231a932ea6eef2b0e3484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 23:09:58 -0400
Subject: auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.

Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.

This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.

eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--
1.9.1
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ba198b1..999a48d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -859,6 +859,22 @@  static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }

+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+	int word, bit;
+
+	if (val > 0xffffffff)
+		return false;
+
+	word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+	if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+		return false;
+
+	bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+	return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
  * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
  * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@@ -876,11 +892,8 @@  static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,

 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (!list_empty(list)) {
-		int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
-		int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+			if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
 			    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
 					       &state, false)) {
 				rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -900,20 +913,16 @@  static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				   struct audit_names *n,
 				   struct audit_context *ctx) {
-	int word, bit;
 	int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
 	struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
 	struct audit_entry *e;
 	enum audit_state state;

-	word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
-	bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
 	if (list_empty(list))
 		return 0;

 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-		if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
 		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return 1;