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[3.11,184/233] btrfs: restrict snapshotting to own subvolumes

Message ID 1391773652-25214-185-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Luis Henriques Feb. 7, 2014, 11:46 a.m. UTC 
3.11.10.4 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>

commit d024206133ce21936b3d5780359afc00247655b7 upstream.

Currently, any user can snapshot any subvolume if the path is accessible and
thus indirectly create and keep files he does not own under his direcotries.
This is not possible with traditional directories.

In security context, a user can snapshot root filesystem and pin any
potentially buggy binaries, even if the updates are applied.

All the snapshots are visible to the administrator, so it's possible to
verify if there are suspicious snapshots.

Another more practical problem is that any user can pin the space used
by eg. root and cause ENOSPC.

Original report:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apparmor/+bug/484786

Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
[ luis: backported to 3.11: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
---
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index 6074a8e..6752118 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -1534,6 +1534,12 @@  static noinline int btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid(struct file *file,
 			printk(KERN_INFO "btrfs: Snapshot src from "
 			       "another FS\n");
 			ret = -EINVAL;
+		} else if (!inode_owner_or_capable(src_inode)) {
+			/*
+			 * Subvolume creation is not restricted, but snapshots
+			 * are limited to own subvolumes only
+			 */
+			ret = -EPERM;
 		} else {
 			ret = btrfs_mksubvol(&file->f_path, name, namelen,
 					     BTRFS_I(src_inode)->root,