Patchwork [net] net: unix: inherit SOCK_PASS{CRED,SEC} flags from socket to fix race

login
register
mail settings
Submitter Daniel Borkmann
Date Oct. 17, 2013, 8:51 p.m.
Message ID <5c4eda258a6d7397a180ca72562b0ce5d87beda1.1382042286.git.dborkman@redhat.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/284366/
State Accepted
Delegated to: David Miller
Headers show

Comments

Daniel Borkmann - Oct. 17, 2013, 8:51 p.m.
In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").

We have a stream server on receiver side that requests credential
passing from senders (e.g. nc -U). Since we need to set SO_PASSCRED
on each spawned/accepted socket on server side to 1 first (as it's
not inherited), it can happen that in the time between accept() and
setsockopt() we get interrupted, the sender is being scheduled and
continues with passing data to our receiver. At that time SO_PASSCRED
is neither set on sender nor receiver side, hence in cmsg's
SCM_CREDENTIALS we get eventually pid:0, uid:65534, gid:65534
(== overflow{u,g}id) instead of what we actually would like to see.

On the sender side, here nc -U, the tests in maybe_add_creds()
invoked through unix_stream_sendmsg() would fail, as at that exact
time, as mentioned, the sender has neither SO_PASSCRED on his side
nor sees it on the server side, and we have a valid 'other' socket
in place. Thus, sender believes it would just look like a normal
connection, not needing/requesting SO_PASSCRED at that time.

As reverting 16e5726 would not be an option due to the significant
performance regression reported when having creds always passed,
one way/trade-off to prevent that would be to set SO_PASSCRED on
the listener socket and allow inheriting these flags to the spawned
socket on server side in accept(). It seems also logical to do so
if we'd tell the listener socket to pass those flags onwards, and
would fix the race.

Before, strace:

recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
        msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
        cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}},
        msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5

After, strace:

recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
        msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
        cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=11580, uid=1000, gid=1000}},
        msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
David Laight - Oct. 18, 2013, 8:26 a.m.
> Subject: [PATCH net] net: unix: inherit SOCK_PASS{CRED,SEC} flags from socket to fix race
> 
> In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
> sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
> commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").
...
> +static void unix_sock_inherit_flags(const struct socket *old,
> +				    struct socket *new)
> +{
> +	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &old->flags))
> +		set_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &new->flags);
> +	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &old->flags))
> +		set_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &new->flags);
> +}
> +

Isn't that just:
	new->flags |= old->flags & (PASSCRED | SOCK_PASSSEC);

	David



--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Daniel Borkmann - Oct. 18, 2013, 8:42 a.m.
On 10/18/2013 10:26 AM, David Laight wrote:
>> Subject: [PATCH net] net: unix: inherit SOCK_PASS{CRED,SEC} flags from socket to fix race
>>
>> In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
>> sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
>> commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").
> ...
>> +static void unix_sock_inherit_flags(const struct socket *old,
>> +				    struct socket *new)
>> +{
>> +	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &old->flags))
>> +		set_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &new->flags);
>> +	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &old->flags))
>> +		set_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &new->flags);
>> +}
>> +
>
> Isn't that just:
> 	new->flags |= old->flags & (PASSCRED | SOCK_PASSSEC);

Nope, please have a look at the individual test_bit() etc
implementations under arch/, and the definitions of
SOCK_PASSCRED and SOCK_PASSSEC.

I though about just setting new->flags = old->flags, but that
would probably be _not_ a good idea, as we actually do not want
to pass other flags than these two relevant ones onwards.

> 	David
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
David Miller - Oct. 19, 2013, 10:50 p.m.
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 22:51:31 +0200

> In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
> sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
> commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").
> 
> We have a stream server on receiver side that requests credential
> passing from senders (e.g. nc -U). Since we need to set SO_PASSCRED
> on each spawned/accepted socket on server side to 1 first (as it's
> not inherited), it can happen that in the time between accept() and
> setsockopt() we get interrupted, the sender is being scheduled and
> continues with passing data to our receiver. At that time SO_PASSCRED
> is neither set on sender nor receiver side, hence in cmsg's
> SCM_CREDENTIALS we get eventually pid:0, uid:65534, gid:65534
> (== overflow{u,g}id) instead of what we actually would like to see.
> 
> On the sender side, here nc -U, the tests in maybe_add_creds()
> invoked through unix_stream_sendmsg() would fail, as at that exact
> time, as mentioned, the sender has neither SO_PASSCRED on his side
> nor sees it on the server side, and we have a valid 'other' socket
> in place. Thus, sender believes it would just look like a normal
> connection, not needing/requesting SO_PASSCRED at that time.
> 
> As reverting 16e5726 would not be an option due to the significant
> performance regression reported when having creds always passed,
> one way/trade-off to prevent that would be to set SO_PASSCRED on
> the listener socket and allow inheriting these flags to the spawned
> socket on server side in accept(). It seems also logical to do so
> if we'd tell the listener socket to pass those flags onwards, and
> would fix the race.
> 
> Before, strace:
> 
> recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
>         msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
>         cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}},
>         msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
> 
> After, strace:
> 
> recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
>         msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
>         cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=11580, uid=1000, gid=1000}},
>         msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>

Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks Daniel.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Patch

diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 86de99a..c1f403b 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1246,6 +1246,15 @@  static int unix_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void unix_sock_inherit_flags(const struct socket *old,
+				    struct socket *new)
+{
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &old->flags))
+		set_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &new->flags);
+	if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &old->flags))
+		set_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &new->flags);
+}
+
 static int unix_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
@@ -1280,6 +1289,7 @@  static int unix_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
 	/* attach accepted sock to socket */
 	unix_state_lock(tsk);
 	newsock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
+	unix_sock_inherit_flags(sock, newsock);
 	sock_graft(tsk, newsock);
 	unix_state_unlock(tsk);
 	return 0;