Patchwork [1/5] Add file_ns_capable() helper function for open-time capability checking (CVE-2013-1959)

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Submitter John Johansen
Date April 30, 2013, 8:59 p.m.
Message ID <1367355545-10432-2-git-send-email-john.johansen@canonical.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/240695/
State New
Headers show

Comments

John Johansen - April 30, 2013, 8:59 p.m.
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Nothing is using it yet, but this will allow us to delay the open-time
checks to use time, without breaking the normal UNIX permission
semantics where permissions are determined by the opener (and the file
descriptor can then be passed to a different process, or the process can
drop capabilities).

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

(cherry picked from commit 935d8aabd4331f47a89c3e1daa5779d23cf244ee)
CVE-2013-1959
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1174590
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 include/linux/capability.h |  2 ++
 kernel/capability.c        | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 98503b7..d9a4f7f4 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@  struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 #define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
 
 
+struct file;
 struct inode;
 struct dentry;
 struct user_namespace;
@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@  extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
 extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
 extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 493d972..f6c2ce5 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -393,6 +393,30 @@  bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 
 /**
+ * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect
+ * @file:  The file we want to check
+ * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect
+ * when the file was opened.
+ *
+ * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not
+ * actually be privileged.
+ */
+bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
+
+/**
  * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *