From patchwork Tue Mar 26 15:19:19 2013 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Luis Henriques X-Patchwork-Id: 231326 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Received: from huckleberry.canonical.com (huckleberry.canonical.com [91.189.94.19]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AA472C0097 for ; Wed, 27 Mar 2013 02:23:15 +1100 (EST) Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=huckleberry.canonical.com) by huckleberry.canonical.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1UKViN-0000ab-NI; Tue, 26 Mar 2013 15:23:07 +0000 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]) by huckleberry.canonical.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1UKVho-0008Dl-Tc for kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com; Tue, 26 Mar 2013 15:22:32 +0000 Received: from bl20-143-66.dsl.telepac.pt ([2.81.143.66] helo=localhost) by youngberry.canonical.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1UKVho-0004gY-ND; Tue, 26 Mar 2013 15:22:32 +0000 From: Luis Henriques To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Subject: [PATCH 060/150] tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2013 15:19:19 +0000 Message-Id: <1364311249-14454-61-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.1.2 In-Reply-To: <1364311249-14454-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> References: <1364311249-14454-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.5 Cc: Tomas Hozza , Greg Kroah-Hartman X-BeenThere: kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list List-Id: Kernel team discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com Sender: kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com 3.5.7.9 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tomas Hozza commit 95a69adab9acfc3981c504737a2b6578e4d846ef upstream. The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user. Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored and a warning is printed into the syslog. Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques --- tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c b/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c index 2984ffb..60a8e29 100644 --- a/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c +++ b/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c @@ -727,13 +727,19 @@ int main(void) len = recvfrom(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0, addr_p, &addr_l); - if (len < 0 || addr.nl_pid) { + if (len < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "recvfrom failed; pid:%u error:%d %s", addr.nl_pid, errno, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } + if (addr.nl_pid) { + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Received packet from untrusted pid:%u", + addr.nl_pid); + continue; + } + incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer; incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg); hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;