Patchwork [3.5.y.z,extended,stable] Patch "Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, " has been added to staging queue

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Submitter Luis Henriques
Date March 13, 2013, 1:07 p.m.
Message ID <1363180074-3838-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/227285/
State New
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Luis Henriques - March 13, 2013, 1:07 p.m.
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled

    Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv,

to the linux-3.5.y-queue branch of the 3.5.y.z extended stable tree 
which can be found at:

 http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.5.y-queue

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please 
reply to this email.

For more information about the 3.5.y.z tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable

Thanks.
-Luis

------

From 3f6535303b96c10ba3a28e6a798bffa5360b5ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2013 10:20:36 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv,
 writev, and security keys

commit 8aec0f5d4137532de14e6554fd5dd201ff3a3c49 upstream.

Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to
compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an
explicit "access_ok()" check before calling
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when
we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to
fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev().

This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements
should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact,
there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel,
and they both seem to get it wrong:

Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb()
also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through
aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to
be missing. Same situation for
security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov().

I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it,
and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat
counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where
copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so
the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat.

While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values.

And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error
handling.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
---
 fs/compat.c            | 15 +++++++--------
 mm/process_vm_access.c |  8 --------
 security/keys/compat.c |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--
1.8.1.2

Patch

diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c
index 1bdb350..8e8461e 100644
--- a/fs/compat.c
+++ b/fs/compat.c
@@ -558,6 +558,10 @@  ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
 	}
 	*ret_pointer = iov;

+	ret = -EFAULT;
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector)))
+		goto out;
+
 	/*
 	 * Single unix specification:
 	 * We should -EINVAL if an element length is not >= 0 and fitting an
@@ -1084,17 +1088,12 @@  static ssize_t compat_do_readv_writev(int type, struct file *file,
 	if (!file->f_op)
 		goto out;

-	ret = -EFAULT;
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector)))
-		goto out;
-
-	tot_len = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs,
+	ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs,
 					       UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack, &iov);
-	if (tot_len == 0) {
-		ret = 0;
+	if (ret <= 0)
 		goto out;
-	}

+	tot_len = ret;
 	ret = rw_verify_area(type, file, pos, tot_len);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c
index 926b466..fd26d04 100644
--- a/mm/process_vm_access.c
+++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c
@@ -429,12 +429,6 @@  compat_process_vm_rw(compat_pid_t pid,
 	if (flags != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;

-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, lvec, liovcnt * sizeof(*lvec)))
-		goto out;
-
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, rvec, riovcnt * sizeof(*rvec)))
-		goto out;
-
 	if (vm_write)
 		rc = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, lvec, liovcnt,
 						  UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack_l,
@@ -459,8 +453,6 @@  free_iovecs:
 		kfree(iov_r);
 	if (iov_l != iovstack_l)
 		kfree(iov_l);
-
-out:
 	return rc;
 }

diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c92d42b..803525f 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@  long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
 					   ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
 					   iovstack, &iov);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
+		goto err;
 	if (ret == 0)
 		goto no_payload_free;

 	ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
-
+err:
 	if (iov != iovstack)
 		kfree(iov);
 	return ret;