From patchwork Fri Jan 25 15:32:22 2013
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Subject: Unix socket buffer attribution
From: Yannick Koehler <yannick@koehler.name>
X-Patchwork-Id: 215777
Message-Id: <CAJ4BwwEY6vc3_rxou6PMxAZCdzW0X5WtsRX3SLGkP3g9df209g@mail.gmail.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2013 10:32:22 -0500

This patch should fix an issue where unix socket buffer remains
accounted as part of the socket sndbuf (sk_wmem_alloc) instead of
being accounted as part of the receiving socket rcvbuf
(sk_rmem_alloc), leading to a situation where if one of the receiving
socket isn't calling recvfrom() the sending socket can no more send to
any of its listeners, even those which properly behave.  This could
create a DOS situation where the unix socket is reachable by many
users on the same linux machine.

Signed-off-by: Yannick Koehler <yannick@koehler.name>

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diff -uprN -X linux-3.6/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-3.6-vanilla/include/net/af_unix.h
linux-3.6/include/net/af_unix.h
--- linux-3.6-vanilla/include/net/af_unix.h 2012-09-30 19:47:46.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-3.6/include/net/af_unix.h 2013-01-24 15:26:20.000000000 -0500
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
  u32 secid; /* Security ID */
 #endif
+ struct sock *peer; /* Skb's peer sk */
 };

 #define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb))
diff -uprN -X linux-3.6/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-3.6-vanilla/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-3.6/net/unix/af_unix.c
--- linux-3.6-vanilla/net/unix/af_unix.c 2012-09-30 19:47:46.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-3.6/net/unix/af_unix.c 2013-01-24 15:24:57.000000000 -0500
@@ -1426,6 +1426,35 @@ static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_bu
 }

 /*
+ * Reduce the refcount from sk_wmem_alloc on the peer sk.
+ * Then remove invoke sock_rfree to release the memory
+ * from the current sock sk_rmem_alloc.
+ */
+static void unix_sock_wrfree(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = UNIXCB(skb).peer;
+
+ if (sk)
+ sk_free(sk);
+
+ sock_rfree(skb);
+}
+
+static inline void unix_set_owner_r(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,
+     struct sock *other)
+{
+ /* This operation garantee the peer sk isn't freed. */
+ atomic_add(1, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
+
+ skb_orphan(skb);
+ skb->sk = other;
+ skb->destructor = unix_sock_wrfree;
+ atomic_add(skb->truesize, &other->sk_rmem_alloc);
+ sk_mem_charge(other, skb->truesize);
+ UNIXCB(skb).peer = sk;
+}
+
+/*
  * Send AF_UNIX data.
  */

@@ -1579,9 +1607,16 @@ restart:
  goto restart;
  }

+ if (atomic_read(&other->sk_rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >=
+    (unsigned)other->sk_rcvbuf) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
  if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
  __net_timestamp(skb);
  maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
+ unix_set_owner_r(skb, sk, other);
  skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
  if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
  unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
@@ -1696,7 +1731,14 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct ki
     (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
  goto pipe_err_free;

+ if (atomic_read(&other->sk_rmem_alloc) + skb->truesize >=
+    (unsigned)other->sk_rcvbuf) {
+ err = -EAGAIN;
+ goto pipe_err_free;
+ }
+
  maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
+ unix_set_owner_r(skb, sk, other);
  skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
  if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
  unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
@@ -1807,7 +1849,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kio
  POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND);

  if (msg->msg_name)
- unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
+ unix_copy_addr(msg, UNIXCB(skb).peer);

  if (size > skb->len - skip)
  size = skb->len - skip;
@@ -2007,7 +2049,7 @@ again:

  /* Copy address just once */
  if (sunaddr) {
- unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
+ unix_copy_addr(msg, UNIXCB(skb).peer);
  sunaddr = NULL;
  }
--
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