Patchwork [U-Boot,RFC,31/44] image: Add signing infrastructure

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Submitter Simon Glass
Date Jan. 5, 2013, 1:52 a.m.
Message ID <1357350734-13737-32-git-send-email-sjg@chromium.org>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/209629/
State Superseded, archived
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Simon Glass - Jan. 5, 2013, 1:52 a.m.
Add a structure to describe an algorithm which can sign and (later) verify
images.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
---
 README                       |    5 +
 common/Makefile              |    1 +
 common/image-sig.c           |   42 +++++++++
 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt |  211 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/image.h              |   99 +++++++++++++++++++-
 tools/Makefile               |    2 +
 6 files changed, 359 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 common/image-sig.c
 create mode 100644 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt

Patch

diff --git a/README b/README
index e54279e..46918c4 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -2685,6 +2685,11 @@  FIT uImage format:
 		most specific compatibility entry of U-Boot's fdt's root node.
 		The order of entries in the configuration's fdt is ignored.
 
+		CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
+		This option enables signature verification of FIT uImages,
+		using a hash signed and verified using RSA. See
+		doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt for more details.
+
 - Standalone program support:
 		CONFIG_STANDALONE_LOAD_ADDR
 
diff --git a/common/Makefile b/common/Makefile
index f945911..8208b0b 100644
--- a/common/Makefile
+++ b/common/Makefile
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@  COBJS-y += console.o
 COBJS-y += dlmalloc.o
 COBJS-y += image.o
 COBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT) += image-fit.o
+COBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += image-sig.o
 COBJS-y += memsize.o
 COBJS-y += stdio.o
 
diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..841c662
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/image-sig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ 
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of
+ * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston,
+ * MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
+#include "mkimage.h"
+#include <time.h>
+#else
+#include <common.h>
+#endif /* !USE_HOSTCC*/
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <image.h>
+
+struct image_sig_algo image_sig_algos[] = {
+};
+
+struct image_sig_algo *image_get_sig_algo(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(image_sig_algos); i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(image_sig_algos[i].name, name))
+			return &image_sig_algos[i];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt b/doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48aa616
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ 
+U-Boot FIT Signature Verification
+=================================
+
+Introduction
+------------
+FIT supports hashing of images so that these hashes can be checked on
+loading. This protects against corruption of the image. However it does not
+prevent the substitution of one image for another.
+
+The signature feature allows the hash to be signed with a private key such
+that it can be verified using a public key later. Provided that the private
+key is kept secret and the public key is stored in a non-volatile place,
+any image can be verified in this way.
+
+See verified-boot.txt for more general information on verified boot.
+
+
+Concepts
+--------
+Some familiarity with public key cryptography is assumed in this section.
+
+The procedure for signing is as follows:
+
+   - hash the image
+   - sign the hash with a private key to produce a signature
+   - store the resulting signature in the FIT
+
+The procedure for verification is:
+
+   - read the FIT
+   - obtain the public key
+   - extract the signature from the FIT
+   - hash the image
+   - verify (with the public key) that the extracted signature matches the
+       hash
+
+The signing is generally performed by mkimage, as part of making a firmware
+image for the device. The verification is normally done in U-Boot on the
+device.
+
+
+Algorithms
+----------
+In general any suitable algorithm can be used to sign and verify a hash.
+At present only one class of algorithms is supported: SHA1 hashing with RSA.
+This works by hashing the image to produce a 20--byte hash.
+
+While it is acceptable to bring in cryptography libraries such as openssl
+on the host side (e.g. mkimage), it is not desirable for U-Boot. For the
+run-time verification side, it is important to keep code and data size as
+small as possible.
+
+For this reason the RSA image verification uses pre-processed public keys
+which can be used with a very small amount of code - just some extraction
+of data from the FDT and exponentiation mod n. Code size impact is around
+5KB (to be confirmed in final implementation).
+
+It is relatively straightforward to add new algorithms if required. If
+another RSA variant is needed, then it can be added to the table in
+image-sig.c. If another algorithm is needed (such as DSA) then it can be
+placed alongside rsa.c, and its functions added to the table in image-sig.c
+also.
+
+
+Creating an RSA key and certificate
+-----------------------------------
+To create a new public key, size 2048 bits:
+
+$ openssl genrsa -F4 -out keys/dev.key 2048
+
+To create a certificate for this:
+
+$ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt
+
+If you like you can look at the public key also:
+
+$ openssl rsa -in keys/dev.key -pubout
+
+
+Device Tree Bindings
+--------------------
+The following properties are required in the FIT's signature node(s) to
+allow thes signer to operate. These should be added to the .its file.
+Signature nodes sit at the same level as hash nodes and are called
+signature@1, signature@2, etc.
+
+- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rs2048")
+
+- key-name-hint: Name of key to use for signing. The keys will normally be in
+a single directory (parameter -k to mkimage). For a given key <name>, its
+private key is stored in <name>.key and the certificate is stored in
+<name>.crt.
+
+When the image is signed, the following properties are added (mandatory):
+
+- value: The signature data (e.g. 256 bytes for 2048-bit RSA)
+
+When the image is signed, the following properties are optional:
+
+- timestamp: Time when image was signed (standard Unix time_t format)
+
+- signer-name: Name of the signer (e.g. "mkimage")
+
+- signer-version: Version string of the signer (e.g. "2013.01")
+
+- comment: Additional information about the signer or image
+
+
+Example: See sign-images.its for an example image tree source file.
+
+
+Public Key Storage
+------------------
+In order to verify an image that has been signed with a public key we need to
+have a trusted public key. This cannot be stored in the signed image, since
+it would be easy to alter. For this implementation we choose to store the
+public key in U-Boot's control FDT (using CONFIG_OF_CONTROL).
+
+Public keys should be stored as sub-nodes in a /signature node. Required
+properties are:
+
+- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rs2048")
+
+Optional properties are:
+
+- key-name-hint: Name of key used for signing. This is only a hint since it
+is possible for the name to be changed. Verification can proceed by checking
+all available signing keys until one matches.
+
+- required: If present this indicates that tje key must be verified for the
+image / configuration to be considered valid. Only required keys are
+normally verified by the FIT image booting algorithm. Valid values are
+"image" to force verification of all images, and "conf" to force verfication
+of the selected configuration (which then relies on hashs in the images to
+verify those).
+
+Each signing algorithm has its own additional properties.
+
+For RSA the following are mandatory:
+
+- rsa,num-bits: Number of key bits (e.g. 2048)
+- rsa,modulus: Modulus (N) as a big-endian multi-word integer
+- rsa,r-squared: (2^num-bits)^2 as a big-endian multi-word integer
+- rsa,n0-inverse: -1 / modulus[0] mod 2^32
+
+
+Verification
+------------
+FITs are verified when loaded. After the configuration is selected a list
+of required images is produced. If there are 'required' public keys, then
+each image must be verified against those keys. This means that every image
+that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys.
+
+This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used.
+
+
+Enabling FIT Verification
+-------------------------
+The following CONFIGs must be enabled:
+
+CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE - enable signing and verfication in FITs
+CONFIG_RSA - enable RSA algorithm for signing
+
+
+Testing
+-------
+An easy way to test signing and verfication is to use the test script
+provided in test/vboot/vboot_test.sh. This uses sandbox (a special version
+of U-Boot which runs under Linux) to show the operation of a 'bootm'
+command loading and verifying images.
+
+A sample run is show below:
+
+$ make O=sandbox sandbox_config
+$ make O=sandbox
+$ O=sandbox ./test/vboot/vboot_test.sh
+Simple Verified Boot Test
+=========================
+
+Please see doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt for more information
+
+Build keys
+Build FIT with signed images
+Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned signatures:: OK
+Sign images
+Test Verified Boot Run: signed images: OK
+Build FIT with signed configuration
+Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned config: OK
+Sign images
+Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK
+
+Test passed
+
+
+Future Work
+-----------
+- Roll-back protection using a TPM (patches are in progress)
+
+
+Possible Future Work
+--------------------
+- Other algorithms besides RSA
+- More sandbox tests for failure modes
+- Passwords for keys/certificates
+- Perhaps implement OAEP
+- Enhance bootm to permit scripted signature verification
+
+
+Simon Glass
+sjg@chromium.org
+1-1-13
diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
index bf734db..8c648dc 100644
--- a/include/image.h
+++ b/include/image.h
@@ -515,11 +515,12 @@  static inline int image_check_target_arch(const image_header_t *hdr)
 #define FIT_IMAGES_PATH		"/images"
 #define FIT_CONFS_PATH		"/configurations"
 
-/* hash node */
+/* hash/signature node */
 #define FIT_HASH_NODENAME	"hash"
 #define FIT_ALGO_PROP		"algo"
 #define FIT_VALUE_PROP		"value"
 #define FIT_IGNORE_PROP		"uboot-ignore"
+#define FIT_SIG_NODENAME	"signature"
 
 /* image node */
 #define FIT_DATA_PROP		"data"
@@ -654,6 +655,102 @@  int fit_check_ramdisk(const void *fit, int os_noffset,
 int calculate_hash(const void *data, int data_len, const char *algo,
 			uint8_t *value, int *value_len);
 
+/*
+ * At present we only support signing on the host, and verification on the
+ * device
+ */
+#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
+# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN	1
+# define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY	0
+# define gd_fdt_blob()		NULL
+#elif defined(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE)
+# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN	0
+# define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY	1
+# define gd_fdt_blob()		(gd->fdt_blob)
+#else
+# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN	0
+# define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY	0
+# define gd_fdt_blob()		(gd->fdt_blob)
+#endif
+
+/* Information passed to the signing routines */
+struct image_sign_info {
+	const char *keydir;		/* Directory conaining keys */
+	const char *keyname;		/* Name of key to use */
+	void *fit;			/* Pointer to FIT blob */
+	int node_offset;		/* Offset of signature node */
+	struct image_sig_algo *algo;	/* Algorithm information */
+	const void *fdt_blob;		/* FDT containing public keys */
+	int required_keynode;		/* Node offset of key to use: -1=any */
+	const char *require_keys;	/* Value for 'required' property */
+};
+
+/* A part of an image, used for hashing */
+struct image_region {
+	const void *data;
+	int size;
+};
+
+struct image_sig_algo {
+	const char *name;		/* Name of algorithm */
+
+	/**
+	 * sign() - calculate and return signature for given input data
+	 *
+	 * @info:	Specifies key and FIT information
+	 * @data:	Pointer to the input data
+	 * @data_len:	Data length
+	 * @sigp:	Set to an allocated buffer holding the signature
+	 * @sig_len:	Set to length of the calculated hash
+	 *
+	 * This computes input data signature according to selected algorithm.
+	 * Resulting signature value is placed in an allocated buffer, the
+	 * pointer is returned as *sigp. The length of the calculated
+	 * signature is returned via the sig_len pointer argument. The caller
+	 * should free *sigp.
+	 *
+	 * @return: 0, on success, -ve on error
+	 */
+	int (*sign)(struct image_sign_info *info,
+		    const struct image_region region[],
+		    int region_count, uint8_t **sigp, uint *sig_len);
+
+	/**
+	 * add_verify_data() - Add verification information to FDT
+	 *
+	 * Add public key information to the FDT node, suitable for
+	 * verification at run-time. The information added depends on the
+	 * algorithm being used.
+	 *
+	 * @info:	Specifies key and FIT information
+	 * @keydest:	Destination FDT blob for public key data
+	 * @return: 0, on success, -ve on error
+	 */
+	int (*add_verify_data)(struct image_sign_info *info, void *keydest);
+
+	/**
+	 * verify() - Verify a signature against some data
+	 *
+	 * @info:	Specifies key and FIT information
+	 * @data:	Pointer to the input data
+	 * @data_len:	Data length
+	 * @sig:	Signature
+	 * @sig_len:	Number of bytes in signature
+	 * @return 0 if verified, -ve on error
+	 */
+	int (*verify)(struct image_sign_info *info,
+		      const struct image_region region[], int region_count,
+		      uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * image_get_sig_algo() - Look up a signature algortihm
+ *
+ * @param name		Name of algorithm
+ * @return pointer to algorithm information, or NULL if not found
+ */
+struct image_sig_algo *image_get_sig_algo(const char *name);
+
 #ifndef USE_HOSTCC
 static inline int fit_image_check_target_arch(const void *fdt, int node)
 {
diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
index eb10ae9..0dae54d 100644
--- a/tools/Makefile
+++ b/tools/Makefile
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@  BIN_FILES-$(CONFIG_KIRKWOOD) += kwboot$(SFX)
 EXT_OBJ_FILES-$(CONFIG_BUILD_ENVCRC) += common/env_embedded.o
 EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += common/image.o
 EXT_OBJ_FILES-$(CONFIG_FIT) += common/image-fit.o
+EXT_OBJ_FILES-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += common/image-sig.o
 EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += lib/crc32.o
 EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += lib/md5.o
 EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += lib/sha1.o
@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@  $(obj)mkimage$(SFX):	$(obj)aisimage.o \
 			$(obj)image-fit.o \
 			$(obj)image.o \
 			$(obj)image-host.o \
+			$(obj)image-sig.o \
 			$(obj)imximage.o \
 			$(obj)kwbimage.o \
 			$(obj)pblimage.o \