Patchwork [3.5.yuz,extended,stable] Patch "firewire: cdev: fix user memory corruption (i386 userland on" has been added to staging queue

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Submitter Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski
Date Nov. 15, 2012, 5:49 a.m.
Message ID <1352958574-16951-1-git-send-email-herton.krzesinski@canonical.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/199172/
State New
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Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski - Nov. 15, 2012, 5:49 a.m.
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled

    firewire: cdev: fix user memory corruption (i386 userland on

to the linux-3.5.y-queue branch of the 3.5.yuz extended stable tree 
which can be found at:

 http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.5.y-queue

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please 
reply to this email.

For more information about the 3.5.yuz tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable

Thanks.
-Herton

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From 09c4b770fe2be9f3559ea24ce8616a3e2caf2edb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
Date: Sat, 6 Oct 2012 14:12:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] firewire: cdev: fix user memory corruption (i386 userland on
 amd64 kernel)

commit 790198f74c9d1b46b6a89504361b1a844670d050 upstream.

Fix two bugs of the /dev/fw* character device concerning the
FW_CDEV_IOC_GET_INFO ioctl with nonzero fw_cdev_get_info.bus_reset.
(Practically all /dev/fw* clients issue this ioctl right after opening
the device.)

Both bugs are caused by sizeof(struct fw_cdev_event_bus_reset) being 36
without natural alignment and 40 with natural alignment.

 1) Memory corruption, affecting i386 userland on amd64 kernel:
    Userland reserves a 36 bytes large buffer, kernel writes 40 bytes.
    This has been first found and reported against libraw1394 if
    compiled with gcc 4.7 which happens to order libraw1394's stack such
    that the bug became visible as data corruption.

 2) Information leak, affecting all kernel architectures except i386:
    4 bytes of random kernel stack data were leaked to userspace.

Hence limit the respective copy_to_user() to the 32-bit aligned size of
struct fw_cdev_event_bus_reset.

Reported-by: Simon Kirby <sim@hostway.ca>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com>
---
 drivers/firewire/core-cdev.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--
1.7.9.5

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/firewire/core-cdev.c b/drivers/firewire/core-cdev.c
index 2783f69..f8d2287 100644
--- a/drivers/firewire/core-cdev.c
+++ b/drivers/firewire/core-cdev.c
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@  static int ioctl_get_info(struct client *client, union ioctl_arg *arg)
 	client->bus_reset_closure = a->bus_reset_closure;
 	if (a->bus_reset != 0) {
 		fill_bus_reset_event(&bus_reset, client);
-		ret = copy_to_user(u64_to_uptr(a->bus_reset),
-				   &bus_reset, sizeof(bus_reset));
+		/* unaligned size of bus_reset is 36 bytes */
+		ret = copy_to_user(u64_to_uptr(a->bus_reset), &bus_reset, 36);
 	}
 	if (ret == 0 && list_empty(&client->link))
 		list_add_tail(&client->link, &client->device->client_list);