Message ID | 1327325535-3177-1-git-send-email-aliguori@us.ibm.com |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
On Mon, 23 Jan 2012, Anthony Liguori wrote: > Otherwise we can write beyond the buffer and corrupt memory. This is tracked > as CVE-2012-0029. The stable-1.0 branch looks vulnerable too, shouldn't this patch be backported? > Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> > --- > hw/e1000.c | 3 +++ > 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/hw/e1000.c b/hw/e1000.c > index a29c944..86c5416 100644 > --- a/hw/e1000.c > +++ b/hw/e1000.c > @@ -466,6 +466,8 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) > bytes = split_size; > if (tp->size + bytes > msh) > bytes = msh - tp->size; > + > + bytes = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, bytes); > pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, bytes); > if ((sz = tp->size + bytes) >= hdr && tp->size < hdr) > memmove(tp->header, tp->data, hdr); > @@ -481,6 +483,7 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) > // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set > DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentaion Error\n"); > } else { > + split_size = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, split_size); > pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, split_size); > tp->size += split_size; > } > -- > 1.7.4.1 > >
On 02.02.2012 15:15, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > On Mon, 23 Jan 2012, Anthony Liguori wrote: >> Otherwise we can write beyond the buffer and corrupt memory. This is tracked >> as CVE-2012-0029. > > The stable-1.0 branch looks vulnerable too, shouldn't this patch be > backported? This goes on since forever - for example, this patch applies to 0.12 too (modulo pci_dma_read() changes which makes the context differ). It applies cleanly to 1.0 stable. /mjt >> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> >> --- >> hw/e1000.c | 3 +++ >> 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/hw/e1000.c b/hw/e1000.c >> index a29c944..86c5416 100644 >> --- a/hw/e1000.c >> +++ b/hw/e1000.c >> @@ -466,6 +466,8 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) >> bytes = split_size; >> if (tp->size + bytes > msh) >> bytes = msh - tp->size; >> + >> + bytes = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, bytes); >> pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, bytes); >> if ((sz = tp->size + bytes) >= hdr && tp->size < hdr) >> memmove(tp->header, tp->data, hdr); >> @@ -481,6 +483,7 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) >> // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set >> DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentaion Error\n"); >> } else { >> + split_size = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, split_size); >> pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, split_size); >> tp->size += split_size; >> } >> -- >> 1.7.4.1 >> >> >
Am 02.02.2012 16:24, schrieb Michael Tokarev: > On 02.02.2012 15:15, Stefano Stabellini wrote: >> On Mon, 23 Jan 2012, Anthony Liguori wrote: >>> Otherwise we can write beyond the buffer and corrupt memory. This is tracked >>> as CVE-2012-0029. >> >> The stable-1.0 branch looks vulnerable too, shouldn't this patch be >> backported? > > This goes on since forever - for example, this patch applies to 0.12 > too (modulo pci_dma_read() changes which makes the context differ). > It applies cleanly to 1.0 stable. Therefore we should cc qemu-stable. :) Andreas >>> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> >>> --- >>> hw/e1000.c | 3 +++ >>> 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/hw/e1000.c b/hw/e1000.c >>> index a29c944..86c5416 100644 >>> --- a/hw/e1000.c >>> +++ b/hw/e1000.c >>> @@ -466,6 +466,8 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) >>> bytes = split_size; >>> if (tp->size + bytes > msh) >>> bytes = msh - tp->size; >>> + >>> + bytes = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, bytes); >>> pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, bytes); >>> if ((sz = tp->size + bytes) >= hdr && tp->size < hdr) >>> memmove(tp->header, tp->data, hdr); >>> @@ -481,6 +483,7 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) >>> // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set >>> DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentaion Error\n"); >>> } else { >>> + split_size = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, split_size); >>> pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, split_size); >>> tp->size += split_size; >>> } >>> -- >>> 1.7.4.1
diff --git a/hw/e1000.c b/hw/e1000.c index a29c944..86c5416 100644 --- a/hw/e1000.c +++ b/hw/e1000.c @@ -466,6 +466,8 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) bytes = split_size; if (tp->size + bytes > msh) bytes = msh - tp->size; + + bytes = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, bytes); pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, bytes); if ((sz = tp->size + bytes) >= hdr && tp->size < hdr) memmove(tp->header, tp->data, hdr); @@ -481,6 +483,7 @@ process_tx_desc(E1000State *s, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp) // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentaion Error\n"); } else { + split_size = MIN(sizeof(tp->data) - tp->size, split_size); pci_dma_read(&s->dev, addr, tp->data + tp->size, split_size); tp->size += split_size; }
Otherwise we can write beyond the buffer and corrupt memory. This is tracked as CVE-2012-0029. Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> --- hw/e1000.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)