[v4,bpf-next,3/4] perf: implement CAP_TRACING
diff mbox series

Message ID 20190906231053.1276792-4-ast@kernel.org
State Changes Requested
Delegated to: BPF Maintainers
Headers show
Series
  • CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING
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Commit Message

Alexei Starovoitov Sept. 6, 2019, 11:10 p.m. UTC
Implement permissions as stated in uapi/linux/capability.h
and update Documentation.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst |  4 ++--
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 10 ++++------
 arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c             |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c                 |  2 +-
 arch/x86/events/intel/core.c                |  2 +-
 arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c                  |  2 +-
 kernel/events/core.c                        | 14 +++++++-------
 kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c               |  2 +-
 kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c             |  4 ++--
 9 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

Patch
diff mbox series

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst
index 72effa7c23b9..c84152d1dfd4 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@  into distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be
 independently enabled and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and
 files of unprivileged users.
 
-Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated
-as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance
+Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_TRACING capability
+are treated as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance
 monitoring and bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel.
 
 Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index 032c7cd3cede..595bf2b1363f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -720,20 +720,18 @@  allowed to execute.
 ====================
 
 Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged
-users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  The default value is 2.
+users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN and without CAP_TRACING).  The default value is 2.
 
 ===  ==================================================================
  -1  Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
 
      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
 
->=0  Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+>=0  Disallow ftrace function tracepoint and raw tracepoint
 
-     Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+>=1  Disallow CPU event access
 
->=1  Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
-
->=2  Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+>=2  Disallow kernel profiling
 ===  ==================================================================
 
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
index ca92e01d0bd1..a204a3c6c68b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@  static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
 	if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid)
 		*addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR);
 
-	if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
+	if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing() &&
 		is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)))
 		*addrp = 0;
 }
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@  static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw)
 			 * exporting it to userspace (avoid exposure of regions
 			 * where we could have speculative execution)
 			 */
-			if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
+			if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing() &&
 				is_kernel_addr(addr))
 				continue;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 5ee3fed881d3..bd713b2dd7c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@  static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	 * users to profile the kernel.
 	 */
 	if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	    !capable_tracing())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index e4c2cb65ea50..a7f8c18bd82b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -3307,7 +3307,7 @@  static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (x86_pmu.version < 3)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable_tracing())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ANY;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
index dee579efb2b2..f379a358c9cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@  static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event)
 	 * the user needs special permissions to be able to use it
 	 */
 	if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) {
-		if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable_tracing())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 0463c1151bae..eaba102e5d91 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4134,7 +4134,7 @@  find_get_context(struct pmu *pmu, struct task_struct *task,
 
 	if (!task) {
 		/* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
-		if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable_tracing())
 			return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 
 		cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
@@ -8741,7 +8741,7 @@  static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable_tracing())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/*
@@ -8801,7 +8801,7 @@  static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable_tracing())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/*
@@ -10588,7 +10588,7 @@  static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
 		}
 		/* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
 		if ((mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM)
-		    && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		    && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -10807,12 +10807,12 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		return err;
 
 	if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
-		if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
 	if (attr.namespaces) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!capable_tracing())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
@@ -10826,7 +10826,7 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 	/* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
 	if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
-	    perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	    perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c b/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c
index c5cd852fe86b..8bc4d7d8c913 100644
--- a/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@  static int hw_breakpoint_parse(struct perf_event *bp,
 		 * Don't let unprivileged users set a breakpoint in the trap
 		 * path to avoid trap recursion attacks.
 		 */
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!capable_tracing())
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
index 0892e38ed6fb..6861307f14d6 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@  static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
 
 	/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
 	if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) {
-		if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable_tracing())
 			return -EPERM;
 
 		if (!is_sampling_event(p_event))
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@  static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
 	 * ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
 	 * only allow root to have these.
 	 */
-	if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable_tracing())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return 0;