Patchwork [hardy,lucid,lucid/fsl-imx51,maverick,maverick/ti-omap4,natty,natty/ti-omap4,CVE,1/1] Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request

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Submitter Andy Whitcroft
Date Sept. 19, 2011, 10:43 a.m.
Message ID <1316428994-838-2-git-send-email-apw@canonical.com>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/115317/
State New
Headers show

Comments

Andy Whitcroft - Sept. 19, 2011, 10:43 a.m.
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>

A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in
the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an
integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request
header.  This results in copying a very large amount of data via
memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap.  Check for underflow.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>

(backported from commit 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71)
CVE-2011-2497
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/838423
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap.c |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
index 0676111..f59b7d5 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@  static inline int l2cap_config_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr
 
 	/* Reject if config buffer is too small. */
 	len = cmd_len - sizeof(*req);
-	if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) {
+	if (len < 0 || l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) {
 		l2cap_send_cmd(conn, cmd->ident, L2CAP_CONF_RSP,
 				l2cap_build_conf_rsp(sk, rsp,
 					L2CAP_CONF_REJECT, flags), rsp);