From patchwork Sun Aug 25 16:35:17 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexander Wetzel X-Patchwork-Id: 1152822 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=lists.infradead.org (client-ip=2607:7c80:54:e::133; helo=bombadil.infradead.org; envelope-from=hostap-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@lists.infradead.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=fail (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=wetzel-home.de Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="NPIbJKaF"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; secure) header.d=wetzel-home.de header.i=@wetzel-home.de header.b="qndsOY0O"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [IPv6:2607:7c80:54:e::133]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 46GgmN4pf6z9s7T for ; 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Sun, 25 Aug 2019 16:37:54 +0000 Received: from 4.mo68.mail-out.ovh.net ([46.105.59.63]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1i1vUl-0003ft-GN for hostap@lists.infradead.org; Sun, 25 Aug 2019 16:36:04 +0000 Received: from player750.ha.ovh.net (unknown [10.109.146.143]) by mo68.mail-out.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D694140C79 for ; Sun, 25 Aug 2019 18:35:50 +0200 (CEST) Received: from awhome.eu (p57B7E04C.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [87.183.224.76]) (Authenticated sender: postmaster@awhome.eu) by player750.ha.ovh.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BDE2393046EC; Sun, 25 Aug 2019 16:35:46 +0000 (UTC) From: Alexander Wetzel DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=wetzel-home.de; s=wetzel-home; t=1566750941; bh=TIUy3mdw2R1L+vQNHpsO8Pi3P/Wsnwz/cOrxKHvmS40=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=qndsOY0ONj/10ddrmfFnhN3DlOgzAQwUymiqJzUkqxyIMEtHPtB1xUMFiEk21WBQA L4A9rap4PoVj7g7TyuEW6pkkY6VNKLNnWI2OZFvQotZCDVoatjEkIHWB3wTobE5+z0 3kVxVGNz4u3263u76750ERIJEn9kc5z5FaZWBKTg= To: j@w1.fi Subject: [PATCH v5 12/16] hostapd: FILS Extended Key ID support Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2019 18:35:17 +0200 Message-Id: <20190825163521.22625-13-alexander@wetzel-home.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.23.0 In-Reply-To: <20190825163521.22625-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> References: <20190825163521.22625-1-alexander@wetzel-home.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Ovh-Tracer-Id: 13323336548978466044 X-VR-SPAMSTATE: OK X-VR-SPAMSCORE: 0 X-VR-SPAMCAUSE: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgeduvddrudehvddguddthecutefuodetggdotefrodftvfcurfhrohhfihhlvgemucfqggfjpdevjffgvefmvefgnecuuegrihhlohhuthemucehtddtnecu X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20190825_093559_682701_31857455 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.44 ) X-Spam-Score: -0.2 (/) X-Spam-Report: SpamAssassin version 3.4.2 on bombadil.infradead.org summary: Content analysis details: (-0.2 points) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [46.105.59.63 listed in list.dnswl.org] -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID_EF Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from envelope-from domain X-BeenThere: hostap@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Alexander Wetzel , hostap@lists.infradead.org, luca@coelho.fi, johannes@sipsolutions.net Sender: "Hostap" Errors-To: hostap-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@lists.infradead.org IEEE 802.11ai - 2016 is missing any instructions how to handle it in combination with Extended Key ID. There are two obvious ways: 1) FILS can only use keyid 0 and the STAs decide on rekey if they can use Extended Key ID or not. 2) FILS also checks if Extended Key ID can be used by both STAs and adds the KeyID KDE when it's being used in the initial handshake. The later seems to be closer to the intent of 802.11ai and since there are no other implementations for Extended Key ID to consider this patch implements option 2) for now. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel --- Now this is a very free interpretation of how to handle Extended Key ID in combination with FILS. Technically it's the same issue as we have for FT, so I'm using the same (arguable) solution here: We bypass the 4-way handshake and Extended Key ID is therefore mostly irrelevant. Neither FILS nor FT discuss Extended Key ID at all but both have a mechanism to hand over/get the GTK ID. Which of course can also pass over the (unicast) KeyID required for Extended Key ID support... Now the new patch series is rigorously sticking to the key install mode used at the initial connect: When either the AP or the STA tries to use anything else than for the connect we kill the connection. By also adding the KeyID to the KDEs these checks work basically out of the box and the Extended Key ID flag in the RSN capabilities serves a purpose. Alternatively we could relax the checks and accept that we either still set the Extended Key ID bit in RSN but just assume the keyid is always zero for FT and FILS or even drop the bit in the RSN capabilities and relax the sanity checks for FILS and FT accordingly. Since not Extended Key ID capable STAs won't care either way and there are zero implementations for Extended Key ID we have to stay compatible with I decided to first try what I consider the cleanest way. Therefore Unicast KeyIDs have been added to the frames transporting also the GTK ID. Based on the feedback we either keep or change it. src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c index 0213e97c2..af3b855fb 100644 --- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c @@ -2692,6 +2692,15 @@ static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpabuf_put_u8(plain, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY); wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, wpabuf_put(plain, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN)); + + hdr[1] = 0; + if (sm->use_extended_key_id) { + hdr[0] = sm->keyidx_active & 0x01; + tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0); + tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID, hdr, 2, NULL, 0); + wpabuf_put(plain, tmp2 - tmp); + } + /* GTK KDE */ gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1]; gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len; @@ -2708,7 +2717,6 @@ static struct wpabuf * fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, gtk = dummy_gtk; } hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03; - hdr[1] = 0; tmp = wpabuf_put(plain, 0); tmp2 = wpa_add_kde(tmp, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2, gtk, gtk_len); @@ -2763,7 +2771,7 @@ int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise); wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver"); - if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0, + if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, sm->keyidx_active, sm->PTK.tk, klen, KEY_TYPE_PAIRWISE)) { wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver"); return -1;