From patchwork Tue Apr 9 21:08:57 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Daniel Borkmann X-Patchwork-Id: 1082755 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming-bpf@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming-bpf@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=bpf-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=iogearbox.net Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44f0Lb5pPnz9sSs for ; Wed, 10 Apr 2019 07:10:31 +1000 (AEST) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726709AbfDIVKa (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 17:10:30 -0400 Received: from www62.your-server.de ([213.133.104.62]:49758 "EHLO www62.your-server.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726685AbfDIVK2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Apr 2019 17:10:28 -0400 Received: from [178.197.248.24] (helo=localhost) by www62.your-server.de with esmtpsa (TLSv1.2:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89_1) (envelope-from ) id 1hDy0a-0000E7-I9; Tue, 09 Apr 2019 23:10:20 +0200 From: Daniel Borkmann To: bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, joe@wand.net.nz, yhs@fb.com, andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com, kafai@fb.com, jannh@google.com, Daniel Borkmann Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v6 03/16] bpf: add program side {rd, wr}only support for maps Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 23:08:57 +0200 Message-Id: <20190409210910.32048-4-daniel@iogearbox.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.9.5 In-Reply-To: <20190409210910.32048-1-daniel@iogearbox.net> References: <20190409210910.32048-1-daniel@iogearbox.net> X-Authenticated-Sender: daniel@iogearbox.net X-Virus-Scanned: Clear (ClamAV 0.100.3/25414/Tue Apr 9 09:53:33 2019) Sender: bpf-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org This work adds two new map creation flags BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG in order to allow for read-only or write-only BPF maps from a BPF program side. Today we have BPF_F_RDONLY and BPF_F_WRONLY, but this only applies to system call side, meaning the BPF program has full read/write access to the map as usual while bpf(2) calls with map fd can either only read or write into the map depending on the flags. BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG allows for the exact opposite such that verifier is going to reject program loads if write into a read-only map or a read into a write-only map is detected. For read-only map case also some helpers are forbidden for programs that would alter the map state such as map deletion, update, etc. As opposed to the two BPF_F_RDONLY / BPF_F_WRONLY flags, BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG as well as BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG really do correspond to the map lifetime. We've enabled this generic map extension to various non-special maps holding normal user data: array, hash, lru, lpm, local storage, queue and stack. Further generic map types could be followed up in future depending on use-case. Main use case here is to forbid writes into .rodata map values from verifier side. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau --- include/linux/bpf.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++- kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 6 ++++- kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 6 ++--- kernel/bpf/local_storage.c | 6 ++--- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 3 ++- kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c | 6 ++--- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 ++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 9 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index bd93a592dd29..be20804631b5 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -430,6 +430,35 @@ struct bpf_array { #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 1000000 /* yes. 1M insns */ #define MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT 32 +#define BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK (BPF_F_RDONLY | \ + BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | \ + BPF_F_WRONLY | \ + BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG) + +#define BPF_MAP_CAN_READ BIT(0) +#define BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE BIT(1) + +static inline u32 bpf_map_flags_to_cap(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + u32 access_flags = map->map_flags & (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG); + + /* Combination of BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG is + * not possible. + */ + if (access_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) + return BPF_MAP_CAN_READ; + else if (access_flags & BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG) + return BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE; + else + return BPF_MAP_CAN_READ | BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE; +} + +static inline bool bpf_map_flags_access_ok(u32 access_flags) +{ + return (access_flags & (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)) != + (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG); +} + struct bpf_event_entry { struct perf_event *event; struct file *perf_file; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 26cfb5b2c964..d275446d807c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ enum bpf_attach_type { #define BPF_OBJ_NAME_LEN 16U -/* Flags for accessing BPF object */ +/* Flags for accessing BPF object from syscall side. */ #define BPF_F_RDONLY (1U << 3) #define BPF_F_WRONLY (1U << 4) @@ -304,6 +304,10 @@ enum bpf_attach_type { /* Zero-initialize hash function seed. This should only be used for testing. */ #define BPF_F_ZERO_SEED (1U << 6) +/* Flags for accessing BPF object from program side. */ +#define BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG (1U << 7) +#define BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG (1U << 8) + /* flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY */ #define BPF_F_QUERY_EFFECTIVE (1U << 0) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c index 1a6e9861d554..217b10bd9f48 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include "map_in_map.h" #define ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \ - (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY) + (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK) static void bpf_array_free_percpu(struct bpf_array *array) { @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ int array_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr) if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 || attr->value_size == 0 || attr->map_flags & ~ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK || + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags) || (percpu && numa_node != NUMA_NO_NODE)) return -EINVAL; @@ -472,6 +473,9 @@ static int fd_array_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr) /* only file descriptors can be stored in this type of map */ if (attr->value_size != sizeof(u32)) return -EINVAL; + /* Program read-only/write-only not supported for special maps yet. */ + if (attr->map_flags & (BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG | BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG)) + return -EINVAL; return array_map_alloc_check(attr); } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c index fed15cf94dca..192d32e77db3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #define HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \ (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NO_COMMON_LRU | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \ - BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY | BPF_F_ZERO_SEED) + BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK | BPF_F_ZERO_SEED) struct bucket { struct hlist_nulls_head head; @@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ static int htab_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr) /* Guard against local DoS, and discourage production use. */ return -EPERM; - if (attr->map_flags & ~HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK) - /* reserved bits should not be used */ + if (attr->map_flags & ~HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK || + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags)) return -EINVAL; if (!lru && percpu_lru) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c index 6b572e2de7fb..980e8f1f6cb5 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct bpf_cgroup_storage*, bpf_cgroup_storage[MAX_BPF_CGROUP_STO #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF #define LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \ - (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY) + (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK) struct bpf_cgroup_storage_map { struct bpf_map map; @@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *cgroup_storage_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) if (attr->value_size > PAGE_SIZE) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); - if (attr->map_flags & ~LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK) - /* reserved bits should not be used */ + if (attr->map_flags & ~LOCAL_STORAGE_CREATE_FLAG_MASK || + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); if (attr->max_entries) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c index 93a5cbbde421..e61630c2e50b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int trie_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key) #define LPM_KEY_SIZE_MIN LPM_KEY_SIZE(LPM_DATA_SIZE_MIN) #define LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \ - BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY) + BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK) static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) { @@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) if (attr->max_entries == 0 || !(attr->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC) || attr->map_flags & ~LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK || + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags) || attr->key_size < LPM_KEY_SIZE_MIN || attr->key_size > LPM_KEY_SIZE_MAX || attr->value_size < LPM_VAL_SIZE_MIN || diff --git a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c index b384ea9f3254..0b140d236889 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c @@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ #include "percpu_freelist.h" #define QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \ - (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY) - + (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK) struct bpf_queue_stack { struct bpf_map map; @@ -52,7 +51,8 @@ static int queue_stack_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr) /* check sanity of attributes */ if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 0 || attr->value_size == 0 || - attr->map_flags & ~QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK) + attr->map_flags & ~QUEUE_STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK || + !bpf_map_flags_access_ok(attr->map_flags)) return -EINVAL; if (attr->value_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 56b4b0e08b3b..0c9276b54c88 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -501,6 +501,8 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf, map->spin_lock_off = btf_find_spin_lock(btf, value_type); if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { + if (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) + return -EACCES; if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH && map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY && map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 6ab7a23fc924..b747434df89c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1439,6 +1439,28 @@ static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return 0; } +static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, + int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) +{ + struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); + struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; + u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); + + if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { + verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", + map->value_size, off, size); + return -EACCES; + } + + if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { + verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", + map->value_size, off, size); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; +} + /* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed) @@ -2024,7 +2046,9 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); return -EACCES; } - + err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); + if (err) + return err; err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); @@ -2327,6 +2351,10 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, zero_size_allowed); case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: + if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, + meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : + BPF_READ)) + return -EACCES; return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, zero_size_allowed); default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */ @@ -3059,6 +3087,7 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, int func_id, int insn_idx) { struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; + struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && @@ -3069,11 +3098,24 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) return 0; - if (meta->map_ptr == NULL) { + if (map == NULL) { verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); return -EINVAL; } + /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions + * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the + * state of the map from program side. + */ + if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && + (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { + verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state)) bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array);