| Message ID | 20190116124521.17109-1-peter@korsgaard.com |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Commit | 4e1b3c6e9f9096f0906ff508c21818408bd1e4b6 |
| Headers | show |
| Series | package/wolfssl: security bump to version 3.5.17 | expand |
>>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> writes: > From the release notes: > This release of wolfSSL includes a fix for 1 security vulnerability. > Medium level fix for potential cache attack with a variant of > Bleichenbacher’s attack. Earlier versions of wolfSSL leaked PKCS #1 v1.5 > padding information during private key decryption that could lead to a > potential padding oracle attack. It is recommended that users update to the > latest version of wolfSSL if they have RSA cipher suites enabled and have > the potential for malicious software to be ran on the same system that is > performing RSA operations. Users that have only ECC cipher suites enabled > and are not performing RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 Decryption operations are not > vulnerable. Also users with TLS 1.3 only connections are not vulnerable to > this attack. Thanks to Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham > (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), Adi Shamir > (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom (University of > Adelaide and Data61) for the report. > The paper for further reading on the attack details can be found at > http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> > --- > ...-with-the-creation-of-dummy-fips.h-header.patch | 33 ---------------------- > package/wolfssl/wolfssl.hash | 2 +- > package/wolfssl/wolfssl.mk | 2 +- > 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) > delete mode 100644 package/wolfssl/0001-Fix-issue-with-the-creation-of-dummy-fips.h-header.patch Committed after adding a comment that this patch is now upstream, thanks.
>>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> writes: > From the release notes: > This release of wolfSSL includes a fix for 1 security vulnerability. > Medium level fix for potential cache attack with a variant of > Bleichenbacher’s attack. Earlier versions of wolfSSL leaked PKCS #1 v1.5 > padding information during private key decryption that could lead to a > potential padding oracle attack. It is recommended that users update to the > latest version of wolfSSL if they have RSA cipher suites enabled and have > the potential for malicious software to be ran on the same system that is > performing RSA operations. Users that have only ECC cipher suites enabled > and are not performing RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 Decryption operations are not > vulnerable. Also users with TLS 1.3 only connections are not vulnerable to > this attack. Thanks to Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham > (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), Adi Shamir > (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom (University of > Adelaide and Data61) for the report. > The paper for further reading on the attack details can be found at > http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Committed to 2018.02.x and 2018.11.x, thanks.
diff --git a/package/wolfssl/0001-Fix-issue-with-the-creation-of-dummy-fips.h-header.patch b/package/wolfssl/0001-Fix-issue-with-the-creation-of-dummy-fips.h-header.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0e9dec751d..0000000000 --- a/package/wolfssl/0001-Fix-issue-with-the-creation-of-dummy-fips.h-header.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -From a7fe5e35025227e348eaef5a15fd55f591d77206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: John Safranek <john@wolfssl.com> -Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 13:15:35 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix issue with the creation of dummy fips.h header. - -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - wolfssl/wolfcrypt/include.am | 5 ++++- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/include.am b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/include.am -index c81bdd13..6e84ed9d 100644 ---- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/include.am -+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/include.am -@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ nobase_include_HEADERS+= \ - wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fe_operations.h \ - wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ge_operations.h \ - wolfssl/wolfcrypt/error-crypt.h \ -- wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fips.h \ - wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fips_test.h \ - wolfssl/wolfcrypt/hash.h \ - wolfssl/wolfcrypt/hc128.h \ -@@ -99,3 +98,7 @@ if BUILD_SELFTEST - nobase_include_HEADERS+= wolfssl/wolfcrypt/selftest.h - endif - -+if BUILD_FIPS_V2 -+nobase_include_HEADERS+= wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fips.h -+endif -+ --- -2.11.0 - diff --git a/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.hash b/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.hash index 2fdaa5762b..1ff9fc61d8 100644 --- a/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.hash +++ b/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.hash @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # Locally computed: -sha256 4e15f494604e41725499f8b708798f8ddc2fcaa8f39b4369bcd000b3cab482d8 v3.15.5-stable.tar.gz +sha256 70e4fbeb91284a269b25a84fc526755c670475aee4034a6f237b1f754d108af3 v3.15.7-stable.tar.gz # Hash for license files: sha256 8177f97513213526df2cf6184d8ff986c675afb514d4e68a404010521b880643 COPYING diff --git a/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.mk b/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.mk index aefcea33d0..42198cb817 100644 --- a/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.mk +++ b/package/wolfssl/wolfssl.mk @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -WOLFSSL_VERSION = 3.15.5 +WOLFSSL_VERSION = 3.15.7 WOLFSSL_SITE = https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/archive WOLFSSL_SOURCE = v$(WOLFSSL_VERSION)-stable.tar.gz WOLFSSL_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
From the release notes: This release of wolfSSL includes a fix for 1 security vulnerability. Medium level fix for potential cache attack with a variant of Bleichenbacher’s attack. Earlier versions of wolfSSL leaked PKCS #1 v1.5 padding information during private key decryption that could lead to a potential padding oracle attack. It is recommended that users update to the latest version of wolfSSL if they have RSA cipher suites enabled and have the potential for malicious software to be ran on the same system that is performing RSA operations. Users that have only ECC cipher suites enabled and are not performing RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 Decryption operations are not vulnerable. Also users with TLS 1.3 only connections are not vulnerable to this attack. Thanks to Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom (University of Adelaide and Data61) for the report. The paper for further reading on the attack details can be found at http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> --- ...-with-the-creation-of-dummy-fips.h-header.patch | 33 ---------------------- package/wolfssl/wolfssl.hash | 2 +- package/wolfssl/wolfssl.mk | 2 +- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 package/wolfssl/0001-Fix-issue-with-the-creation-of-dummy-fips.h-header.patch