@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ enum { SCTP_MAX_GABS = 16 };
* to which we will raise the P-MTU.
*/
#define SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT 512 /* MTU size ... if no mtu disc */
-#define SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS 2 /* How many secrets I keep */
+
#define SCTP_SECRET_SIZE 32 /* Number of octets in a 256 bits. */
#define SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20 /* size of a SLA-1 signature */
@@ -1236,10 +1236,7 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
* Discussion in [RFC1750] can be helpful in
* selection of the key.
*/
- __u8 secret_key[SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS][SCTP_SECRET_SIZE];
- int current_key;
- int last_key;
- int key_changed_at;
+ __u8 secret_key[SCTP_SECRET_SIZE];
/* digest: This is a digest of the sctp cookie. This field is
* only used on the receive path when we try to validate
@@ -151,9 +151,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy;
/* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */
- get_random_bytes(&ep->secret_key[0], SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
- ep->last_key = ep->current_key = 0;
- ep->key_changed_at = jiffies;
+ get_random_bytes(ep->secret_key, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
/* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
@@ -249,8 +247,6 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
- int i;
-
SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -273,8 +269,7 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
- for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
- memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
+ memset(ep->secret_key, 0, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
/* Remove and free the port */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
@@ -1650,8 +1650,8 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
/* Sign the message. */
sg_init_one(&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize);
- keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
- key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
+ keylen = sizeof(ep->secret_key);
+ key = (char *) ep->secret_key;
desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
desc.flags = 0;
@@ -1718,9 +1718,9 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(
goto no_hmac;
/* Check the signature. */
- keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
sg_init_one(&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize);
- key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
+ keylen = sizeof(ep->secret_key);
+ key = (char *) ep->secret_key;
desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
desc.flags = 0;
@@ -1732,20 +1732,8 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(
}
if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
- /* Try the previous key. */
- key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->last_key];
- memset(digest, 0x00, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) ||
- crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) {
- *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
- /* Yikes! Still bad signature! */
- *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
- goto fail;
- }
+ *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
+ goto fail;
}
no_hmac:
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere. Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments. Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> --- include/net/sctp/constants.h | 2 +- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 5 +---- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 9 ++------- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 24 ++++++------------------ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)