diff mbox

[1/2] vfio powerpc: implemented IOMMU driver for VFIO

Message ID 1353661396-14374-2-git-send-email-aik@ozlabs.ru (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Headers show

Commit Message

Alexey Kardashevskiy Nov. 23, 2012, 9:03 a.m. UTC
VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.

The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
guest).

The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.

Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
---
 drivers/vfio/Kconfig                |    6 +
 drivers/vfio/Makefile               |    1 +
 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c |  247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/vfio.h                |   20 +++
 4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c

Comments

Alex Williamson Nov. 26, 2012, 6:20 p.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, 2012-11-23 at 20:03 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
> a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
> or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.
> 
> The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
> and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
> which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
> provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
> guest).
> 
> The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.
> 
> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> ---
>  drivers/vfio/Kconfig                |    6 +
>  drivers/vfio/Makefile               |    1 +
>  drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c |  247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/vfio.h                |   20 +++
>  4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
> --- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> @@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
>  	depends on VFIO
>  	default n
>  
> +config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
> +	tristate
> +	depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
> +	default n
> +
>  menuconfig VFIO
>  	tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
>  	depends on IOMMU_API
>  	select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
> +	select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
>  	help
>  	  VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
>  	  See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
> --- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
>  obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..46a6298
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
> +/*
> + * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp.  All rights reserved.
> + *     Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + *
> + * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
> + *     Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/pci.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/vfio.h>
> +#include <asm/iommu.h>
> +
> +#define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.1"
> +#define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "aik@ozlabs.ru"
> +#define DRIVER_DESC     "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
> +
> +static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
> +
> +/*
> + * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
> + * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
> + * at the moment of initialization.
> + */
> +struct tce_container {
> +	struct mutex lock;
> +	struct iommu_table *tbl;
> +};
> +
> +static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
> +{
> +	struct tce_container *container;
> +
> +	if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
> +		printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +	}
> +
> +	container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!container)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> +	mutex_init(&container->lock);
> +
> +	return container;
> +}
> +
> +static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
> +{
> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> +
> +	WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);

I think your patch ordering is backwards here.  it_group isn't added
until 2/2.  I'd really like to see the arch/powerpc code approved and
merged by the powerpc maintainer before we add the code that makes use
of it into vfio.  Otherwise we just get lots of churn if interfaces
change or they disapprove of it altogether.

> +	if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
> +		tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
> +
> +	mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
> +
> +	kfree(container);
> +}
> +
> +static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
> +				 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> +	unsigned long minsz;
> +
> +	switch (cmd) {
> +	case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
> +		return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
> +	}
> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
> +		struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> +
> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> +			return -ENXIO;
> +
> +		minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
> +				dma64_window_size);
> +
> +		if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> +			return -EFAULT;
> +
> +		if (info.argsz < minsz)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
> +		info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		info.dma64_window_start = 0;
> +		info.dma64_window_size = 0;
> +		info.flags = 0;
> +
> +		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
> +			return -EFAULT;
> +
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> +		enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
> +
> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> +			return -ENXIO;
> +
> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
> +
> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> +			return -EFAULT;
> +
> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
> +		if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
> +				(param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
> +			direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
> +			direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
> +			direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
> +		}
> +
> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);

On x86 we force iova, vaddr, and size to all be aligned to the smallest
page granularity of the iommu and return -EINVAL if it doesn't fit.
What does it imply to the user if they're always aligned to work here?
Won't this interface happily map overlapping entries with no indication
to the user that the previous mapping is no longer valid?

Maybe another reason why a combined unmap/map makes me nervous, we have
to assume the user knows what they're doing.

> +
> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> +				param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
> +				param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> +	}
> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> +
> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> +			return -ENXIO;
> +
> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
> +
> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> +			return -EFAULT;
> +
> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> +				0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> +	}
> +	default:
> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);

pr_warn

> +	}
> +
> +	return -ENOTTY;
> +}
> +
> +static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
> +{
> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> +	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
> +
> +	BUG_ON(!tbl);
> +	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
> +	pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
> +			iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
> +	if (container->tbl) {
> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",

pr_warn

> +				iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
> +		mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
> +		return -EBUSY;
> +	}
> +
> +	container->tbl = tbl;

Would it be too much paranoia to clear all the tce here as you do below
on detach?  ie. is there any risk that there's leftover programming?
x86 allocates a new domain on open of the iommu, so we always start out
clean.

> +	mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
> +{
> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> +	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
> +
> +	BUG_ON(!tbl);
> +	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
> +	if (tbl != container->tbl) {
> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: detaching group #%u, expected group is #%u\n",

pr_warn

> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group),
> +				iommu_group_id(tbl->it_group));
> +	} else {
> +
> +		pr_debug("tce_vfio: detaching group #%u from iommu %p\n",
> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
> +
> +		iommu_put_tces(tbl, tbl->it_offset, 0, DMA_NONE, tbl->it_size);

So this cleans out any mappings when vfio is closed, good.

> +		container->tbl = NULL;
> +	}
> +	mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
> +}
> +
> +const struct vfio_iommu_driver_ops tce_iommu_driver_ops = {
> +	.name		= "iommu-vfio-powerpc",
> +	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
> +	.open		= tce_iommu_open,
> +	.release	= tce_iommu_release,
> +	.ioctl		= tce_iommu_ioctl,
> +	.attach_group	= tce_iommu_attach_group,
> +	.detach_group	= tce_iommu_detach_group,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init tce_iommu_init(void)
> +{
> +	return vfio_register_iommu_driver(&tce_iommu_driver_ops);
> +}
> +
> +static void __exit tce_iommu_cleanup(void)
> +{
> +	vfio_unregister_iommu_driver(&tce_iommu_driver_ops);
> +}
> +
> +module_init(tce_iommu_init);
> +module_exit(tce_iommu_cleanup);
> +
> +MODULE_VERSION(DRIVER_VERSION);
> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
> +MODULE_AUTHOR(DRIVER_AUTHOR);
> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DRIVER_DESC);
> +
> diff --git a/include/linux/vfio.h b/include/linux/vfio.h
> index 0a4f180..3ecd65c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/vfio.h
> +++ b/include/linux/vfio.h
> @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ extern void vfio_unregister_iommu_driver(
>  /* Extensions */
>  
>  #define VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU		1
> +#define VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU		2
>  
>  /*
>   * The IOCTL interface is designed for extensibility by embedding the
> @@ -442,4 +443,23 @@ struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_unmap {
>  
>  #define VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA _IO(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 14)
>  
> +/* -------- Additional API for SPAPR TCE (Server POWERPC) IOMMU -------- */
> +
> +struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info {
> +	__u32 argsz;
> +	__u32 flags;
> +	__u32 dma32_window_start;
> +	__u32 dma32_window_size;
> +	__u64 dma64_window_start;
> +	__u64 dma64_window_size;
> +};

Is there anything we can document about this?  It should probably list
that size is in bytes.  Is there any need to communicate the IOMMU page
size here?

> +
> +#define VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO	_IO(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 12)
> +
> +/* Reuse type1 map/unmap structs as they are the same at the moment */
> +typedef struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map;
> +typedef struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_unmap vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap;
> +
> +/* ***************************************************************** */
> +
>  #endif /* VFIO_H */

Thanks,

Alex
Alexey Kardashevskiy Nov. 27, 2012, 4:06 a.m. UTC | #2
On 27/11/12 05:20, Alex Williamson wrote:
> On Fri, 2012-11-23 at 20:03 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>> VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
>> a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
>> or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.
>>
>> The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
>> and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
>> which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
>> provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
>> guest).
>>
>> The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.
>>
>> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>> ---
>>   drivers/vfio/Kconfig                |    6 +
>>   drivers/vfio/Makefile               |    1 +
>>   drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c |  247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   include/linux/vfio.h                |   20 +++
>>   4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
>>   create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
>> index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
>> --- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
>> @@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
>>   	depends on VFIO
>>   	default n
>>
>> +config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
>> +	tristate
>> +	depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
>> +	default n
>> +
>>   menuconfig VFIO
>>   	tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
>>   	depends on IOMMU_API
>>   	select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
>> +	select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
>>   	help
>>   	  VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
>>   	  See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
>> index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
>> --- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
>> @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
>>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
>>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
>>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..46a6298
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
>> +/*
>> + * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp.  All rights reserved.
>> + *     Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>> + *
>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
>> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
>> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
>> + *
>> + * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
>> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
>> + *     Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/module.h>
>> +#include <linux/pci.h>
>> +#include <linux/slab.h>
>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> +#include <linux/err.h>
>> +#include <linux/vfio.h>
>> +#include <asm/iommu.h>
>> +
>> +#define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.1"
>> +#define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "aik@ozlabs.ru"
>> +#define DRIVER_DESC     "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
>> +
>> +static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
>> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
>> + */
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
>> + * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
>> + * at the moment of initialization.
>> + */
>> +struct tce_container {
>> +	struct mutex lock;
>> +	struct iommu_table *tbl;
>> +};
>> +
>> +static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
>> +{
>> +	struct tce_container *container;
>> +
>> +	if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
>> +		printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
>> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
>> +	if (!container)
>> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>> +
>> +	mutex_init(&container->lock);
>> +
>> +	return container;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
>> +{
>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
>> +
>> +	WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);
>
> I think your patch ordering is backwards here.  it_group isn't added
> until 2/2.  I'd really like to see the arch/powerpc code approved and
> merged by the powerpc maintainer before we add the code that makes use
> of it into vfio.  Otherwise we just get lots of churn if interfaces
> change or they disapprove of it altogether.


Makes sense, thanks.


>> +	if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
>> +		tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
>> +
>> +	mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
>> +
>> +	kfree(container);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
>> +				 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>> +{
>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
>> +	unsigned long minsz;
>> +
>> +	switch (cmd) {
>> +	case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
>> +		return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
>> +	}
>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
>> +		struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
>> +
>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
>> +			return -ENXIO;
>> +
>> +		minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
>> +				dma64_window_size);
>> +
>> +		if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
>> +			return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +		if (info.argsz < minsz)
>> +			return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +		info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +		info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +		info.dma64_window_start = 0;
>> +		info.dma64_window_size = 0;
>> +		info.flags = 0;
>> +
>> +		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
>> +			return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +		return 0;
>> +	}
>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
>> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
>> +		enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
>> +
>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
>> +			return -ENXIO;
>> +
>> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
>> +
>> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
>> +			return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
>> +			return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +		if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
>> +				(param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
>> +			direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
>> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
>> +			direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
>> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
>> +			direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
>> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
>
> On x86 we force iova, vaddr, and size to all be aligned to the smallest
> page granularity of the iommu and return -EINVAL if it doesn't fit.
> What does it imply to the user if they're always aligned to work here?
> Won't this interface happily map overlapping entries with no indication
> to the user that the previous mapping is no longer valid?
> Maybe another reason why a combined unmap/map makes me nervous, we have
> to assume the user knows what they're doing.


I got used to guests which do know what they are doing so I am pretty calm :)
but ok, I'll move alignment to the QEMU, it makes sense.


>> +
>> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
>> +				param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
>> +				param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
>> +	}
>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
>> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
>> +
>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
>> +			return -ENXIO;
>> +
>> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
>> +
>> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
>> +			return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
>> +			return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
>> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
>> +				0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
>> +	}
>> +	default:
>> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);
>
> pr_warn
>
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return -ENOTTY;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
>> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
>> +{
>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
>> +	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
>> +
>> +	BUG_ON(!tbl);
>> +	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
>> +	pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
>> +			iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
>> +	if (container->tbl) {
>> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",
>
> pr_warn
>
>> +				iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
>> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
>> +		mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
>> +		return -EBUSY;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	container->tbl = tbl;
>
> Would it be too much paranoia to clear all the tce here as you do below
> on detach?

Guess so. I do unmap on detach() and the guest calls put_tce(0) (i.e. 
unmaps) the whole DMA window at the boot time.


> ie. is there any risk that there's leftover programming?
> x86 allocates a new domain on open of the iommu, so we always start out
> clean.


>> +	mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
>> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
>> +{
>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
>> +	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
>> +
>> +	BUG_ON(!tbl);
>> +	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
>> +	if (tbl != container->tbl) {
>> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: detaching group #%u, expected group is #%u\n",
>
> pr_warn
>
>> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group),
>> +				iommu_group_id(tbl->it_group));
>> +	} else {
>> +
>> +		pr_debug("tce_vfio: detaching group #%u from iommu %p\n",
>> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
>> +
>> +		iommu_put_tces(tbl, tbl->it_offset, 0, DMA_NONE, tbl->it_size);
>
> So this cleans out any mappings when vfio is closed, good.
>
>> +		container->tbl = NULL;
>> +	}
>> +	mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
>> +}
>> +
>> +const struct vfio_iommu_driver_ops tce_iommu_driver_ops = {
>> +	.name		= "iommu-vfio-powerpc",
>> +	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
>> +	.open		= tce_iommu_open,
>> +	.release	= tce_iommu_release,
>> +	.ioctl		= tce_iommu_ioctl,
>> +	.attach_group	= tce_iommu_attach_group,
>> +	.detach_group	= tce_iommu_detach_group,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int __init tce_iommu_init(void)
>> +{
>> +	return vfio_register_iommu_driver(&tce_iommu_driver_ops);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __exit tce_iommu_cleanup(void)
>> +{
>> +	vfio_unregister_iommu_driver(&tce_iommu_driver_ops);
>> +}
>> +
>> +module_init(tce_iommu_init);
>> +module_exit(tce_iommu_cleanup);
>> +
>> +MODULE_VERSION(DRIVER_VERSION);
>> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
>> +MODULE_AUTHOR(DRIVER_AUTHOR);
>> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DRIVER_DESC);
>> +
>> diff --git a/include/linux/vfio.h b/include/linux/vfio.h
>> index 0a4f180..3ecd65c 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/vfio.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/vfio.h
>> @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ extern void vfio_unregister_iommu_driver(
>>   /* Extensions */
>>
>>   #define VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU		1
>> +#define VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU		2
>>
>>   /*
>>    * The IOCTL interface is designed for extensibility by embedding the
>> @@ -442,4 +443,23 @@ struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_unmap {
>>
>>   #define VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA _IO(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 14)
>>
>> +/* -------- Additional API for SPAPR TCE (Server POWERPC) IOMMU -------- */
>> +
>> +struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info {
>> +	__u32 argsz;
>> +	__u32 flags;
>> +	__u32 dma32_window_start;
>> +	__u32 dma32_window_size;
>> +	__u64 dma64_window_start;
>> +	__u64 dma64_window_size;
>> +};
>
> Is there anything we can document about this?

I'll put some.

> It should probably list that size is in bytes.  Is there any need to communicate the IOMMU page
> size here?

It is always 4k. I'll put it to comments.

>> +
>> +#define VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO	_IO(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 12)
>> +
>> +/* Reuse type1 map/unmap structs as they are the same at the moment */
>> +typedef struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map;
>> +typedef struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_unmap vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap;
>> +
>> +/* ***************************************************************** */
>> +
>>   #endif /* VFIO_H */
>
> Thanks,
>
> Alex
>
>
>
Alex Williamson Nov. 27, 2012, 4:29 a.m. UTC | #3
On Tue, 2012-11-27 at 15:06 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 27/11/12 05:20, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Fri, 2012-11-23 at 20:03 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >> VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
> >> a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
> >> or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.
> >>
> >> The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
> >> and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
> >> which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
> >> provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
> >> guest).
> >>
> >> The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.
> >>
> >> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> >> ---
> >>   drivers/vfio/Kconfig                |    6 +
> >>   drivers/vfio/Makefile               |    1 +
> >>   drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c |  247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>   include/linux/vfio.h                |   20 +++
> >>   4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
> >>   create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>
> >> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >> index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >> @@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
> >>   	depends on VFIO
> >>   	default n
> >>
> >> +config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
> >> +	tristate
> >> +	depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
> >> +	default n
> >> +
> >>   menuconfig VFIO
> >>   	tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
> >>   	depends on IOMMU_API
> >>   	select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
> >> +	select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
> >>   	help
> >>   	  VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
> >>   	  See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
> >> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >> index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >> @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
> >>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
> >>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
> >> +obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
> >>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
> >> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >> new file mode 100644
> >> index 0000000..46a6298
> >> --- /dev/null
> >> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >> @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
> >> +/*
> >> + * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
> >> + *
> >> + * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp.  All rights reserved.
> >> + *     Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> >> + *
> >> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> >> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> >> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> >> + *
> >> + * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
> >> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
> >> + *     Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> >> + */
> >> +
> >> +#include <linux/module.h>
> >> +#include <linux/pci.h>
> >> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> >> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >> +#include <linux/err.h>
> >> +#include <linux/vfio.h>
> >> +#include <asm/iommu.h>
> >> +
> >> +#define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.1"
> >> +#define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "aik@ozlabs.ru"
> >> +#define DRIVER_DESC     "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
> >> +
> >> +static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
> >> +
> >> +/*
> >> + * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
> >> + */
> >> +
> >> +/*
> >> + * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
> >> + * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
> >> + * at the moment of initialization.
> >> + */
> >> +struct tce_container {
> >> +	struct mutex lock;
> >> +	struct iommu_table *tbl;
> >> +};
> >> +
> >> +static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
> >> +{
> >> +	struct tce_container *container;
> >> +
> >> +	if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
> >> +		printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
> >> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
> >> +	if (!container)
> >> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> >> +
> >> +	mutex_init(&container->lock);
> >> +
> >> +	return container;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
> >> +{
> >> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >> +
> >> +	WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);
> >
> > I think your patch ordering is backwards here.  it_group isn't added
> > until 2/2.  I'd really like to see the arch/powerpc code approved and
> > merged by the powerpc maintainer before we add the code that makes use
> > of it into vfio.  Otherwise we just get lots of churn if interfaces
> > change or they disapprove of it altogether.
> 
> 
> Makes sense, thanks.
> 
> 
> >> +	if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
> >> +		tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
> >> +
> >> +	mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
> >> +
> >> +	kfree(container);
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
> >> +				 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> >> +{
> >> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >> +	unsigned long minsz;
> >> +
> >> +	switch (cmd) {
> >> +	case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
> >> +		return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
> >> +	}
> >> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
> >> +		struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
> >> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >> +
> >> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >> +			return -ENXIO;
> >> +
> >> +		minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
> >> +				dma64_window_size);
> >> +
> >> +		if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >> +			return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +		if (info.argsz < minsz)
> >> +			return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >> +		info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +		info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +		info.dma64_window_start = 0;
> >> +		info.dma64_window_size = 0;
> >> +		info.flags = 0;
> >> +
> >> +		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
> >> +			return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +		return 0;
> >> +	}
> >> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
> >> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
> >> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >> +		enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
> >> +
> >> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >> +			return -ENXIO;
> >> +
> >> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
> >> +
> >> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >> +			return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >> +			return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >> +		if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
> >> +				(param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
> >> +			direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
> >> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
> >> +			direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
> >> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
> >> +			direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
> >> +		}
> >> +
> >> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >
> > On x86 we force iova, vaddr, and size to all be aligned to the smallest
> > page granularity of the iommu and return -EINVAL if it doesn't fit.
> > What does it imply to the user if they're always aligned to work here?
> > Won't this interface happily map overlapping entries with no indication
> > to the user that the previous mapping is no longer valid?
> > Maybe another reason why a combined unmap/map makes me nervous, we have
> > to assume the user knows what they're doing.
> 
> 
> I got used to guests which do know what they are doing so I am pretty calm :)
> but ok, I'll move alignment to the QEMU, it makes sense.
> 
> 
> >> +
> >> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >> +				param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
> >> +				param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >> +	}
> >> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
> >> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
> >> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >> +
> >> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >> +			return -ENXIO;
> >> +
> >> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
> >> +
> >> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >> +			return -EFAULT;
> >> +
> >> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >> +			return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >> +
> >> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >> +				0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >> +	}
> >> +	default:
> >> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);
> >
> > pr_warn
> >
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	return -ENOTTY;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
> >> +{
> >> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >> +	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
> >> +
> >> +	BUG_ON(!tbl);
> >> +	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
> >> +	pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
> >> +			iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
> >> +	if (container->tbl) {
> >> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",
> >
> > pr_warn
> >
> >> +				iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
> >> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
> >> +		mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
> >> +		return -EBUSY;
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	container->tbl = tbl;
> >
> > Would it be too much paranoia to clear all the tce here as you do below
> > on detach?
> 
> Guess so. I do unmap on detach() and the guest calls put_tce(0) (i.e. 
> unmaps) the whole DMA window at the boot time.

But that's just one user of this interface, we can't assume they'll all
be so agreeable.  If any tces were enabled here, a malicious user would
have a window to host memory, right?  Thanks,

Alex
Alexey Kardashevskiy Nov. 27, 2012, 4:58 a.m. UTC | #4
On 27/11/12 15:29, Alex Williamson wrote:
> On Tue, 2012-11-27 at 15:06 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>> On 27/11/12 05:20, Alex Williamson wrote:
>>> On Fri, 2012-11-23 at 20:03 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>> VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
>>>> a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
>>>> or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.
>>>>
>>>> The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
>>>> and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
>>>> which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
>>>> provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
>>>> guest).
>>>>
>>>> The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.
>>>>
>>>> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>>>> ---
>>>>    drivers/vfio/Kconfig                |    6 +
>>>>    drivers/vfio/Makefile               |    1 +
>>>>    drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c |  247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>    include/linux/vfio.h                |   20 +++
>>>>    4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
>>>>    create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
>>>> index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
>>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
>>>> @@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
>>>>    	depends on VFIO
>>>>    	default n
>>>>
>>>> +config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
>>>> +	tristate
>>>> +	depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
>>>> +	default n
>>>> +
>>>>    menuconfig VFIO
>>>>    	tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
>>>>    	depends on IOMMU_API
>>>>    	select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
>>>> +	select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
>>>>    	help
>>>>    	  VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
>>>>    	  See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
>>>> index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
>>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
>>>> @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
>>>>    obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
>>>>    obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
>>>> +obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
>>>>    obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>> index 0000000..46a6298
>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp.  All rights reserved.
>>>> + *     Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>>>> + *
>>>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
>>>> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
>>>> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
>>>> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
>>>> + *     Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
>>>> + */
>>>> +
>>>> +#include <linux/module.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/pci.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/slab.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/err.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/vfio.h>
>>>> +#include <asm/iommu.h>
>>>> +
>>>> +#define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.1"
>>>> +#define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "aik@ozlabs.ru"
>>>> +#define DRIVER_DESC     "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
>>>> +
>>>> +static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
>>>> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
>>>> +
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
>>>> + */
>>>> +
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
>>>> + * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
>>>> + * at the moment of initialization.
>>>> + */
>>>> +struct tce_container {
>>>> +	struct mutex lock;
>>>> +	struct iommu_table *tbl;
>>>> +};
>>>> +
>>>> +static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	struct tce_container *container;
>>>> +
>>>> +	if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
>>>> +		printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
>>>> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>> +	}
>>>> +
>>>> +	container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
>>>> +	if (!container)
>>>> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>>> +
>>>> +	mutex_init(&container->lock);
>>>> +
>>>> +	return container;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
>>>> +
>>>> +	WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);
>>>
>>> I think your patch ordering is backwards here.  it_group isn't added
>>> until 2/2.  I'd really like to see the arch/powerpc code approved and
>>> merged by the powerpc maintainer before we add the code that makes use
>>> of it into vfio.  Otherwise we just get lots of churn if interfaces
>>> change or they disapprove of it altogether.
>>
>>
>> Makes sense, thanks.
>>
>>
>>>> +	if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
>>>> +		tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
>>>> +
>>>> +	mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
>>>> +
>>>> +	kfree(container);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
>>>> +				 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
>>>> +	unsigned long minsz;
>>>> +
>>>> +	switch (cmd) {
>>>> +	case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
>>>> +		return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
>>>> +	}
>>>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
>>>> +		struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
>>>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
>>>> +			return -ENXIO;
>>>> +
>>>> +		minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
>>>> +				dma64_window_size);
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
>>>> +			return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (info.argsz < minsz)
>>>> +			return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> +		info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> +		info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>> +		info.dma64_window_start = 0;
>>>> +		info.dma64_window_size = 0;
>>>> +		info.flags = 0;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
>>>> +			return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> +		return 0;
>>>> +	}
>>>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
>>>> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
>>>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
>>>> +		enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
>>>> +			return -ENXIO;
>>>> +
>>>> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
>>>> +			return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
>>>> +			return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
>>>> +				(param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
>>>> +			direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
>>>> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
>>>> +			direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
>>>> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
>>>> +			direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
>>>> +		}
>>>> +
>>>> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
>>>> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
>>>
>>> On x86 we force iova, vaddr, and size to all be aligned to the smallest
>>> page granularity of the iommu and return -EINVAL if it doesn't fit.
>>> What does it imply to the user if they're always aligned to work here?
>>> Won't this interface happily map overlapping entries with no indication
>>> to the user that the previous mapping is no longer valid?
>>> Maybe another reason why a combined unmap/map makes me nervous, we have
>>> to assume the user knows what they're doing.
>>
>>
>> I got used to guests which do know what they are doing so I am pretty calm :)
>> but ok, I'll move alignment to the QEMU, it makes sense.
>>
>>
>>>> +
>>>> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
>>>> +				param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
>>>> +				param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>> +	}
>>>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
>>>> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
>>>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
>>>> +			return -ENXIO;
>>>> +
>>>> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
>>>> +			return -EFAULT;
>>>> +
>>>> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
>>>> +			return -EINVAL;
>>>> +
>>>> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
>>>> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
>>>> +
>>>> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
>>>> +				0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>> +	}
>>>> +	default:
>>>> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);
>>>
>>> pr_warn
>>>
>>>> +	}
>>>> +
>>>> +	return -ENOTTY;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
>>>> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
>>>> +	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
>>>> +
>>>> +	BUG_ON(!tbl);
>>>> +	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
>>>> +	pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
>>>> +			iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
>>>> +	if (container->tbl) {
>>>> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",
>>>
>>> pr_warn
>>>
>>>> +				iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
>>>> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
>>>> +		mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
>>>> +		return -EBUSY;
>>>> +	}
>>>> +
>>>> +	container->tbl = tbl;
>>>
>>> Would it be too much paranoia to clear all the tce here as you do below
>>> on detach?
>>
>> Guess so. I do unmap on detach() and the guest calls put_tce(0) (i.e.
>> unmaps) the whole DMA window at the boot time.
>
> But that's just one user of this interface, we can't assume they'll all
> be so agreeable.  If any tces were enabled here, a malicious user would
> have a window to host memory, right?  Thanks,


But I still release pages on detach(), how can this code be not called on 
the guest exit (normal or crashed)?



>
> Alex
>
David Gibson Nov. 27, 2012, 5:06 a.m. UTC | #5
On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 03:58:14PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 27/11/12 15:29, Alex Williamson wrote:
> >On Tue, 2012-11-27 at 15:06 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >>On 27/11/12 05:20, Alex Williamson wrote:
> >>>On Fri, 2012-11-23 at 20:03 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >>>>VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
> >>>>a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
> >>>>or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.
> >>>>
> >>>>The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
> >>>>and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
> >>>>which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
> >>>>provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
> >>>>guest).
> >>>>
> >>>>The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.
> >>>>
> >>>>Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> >>>>Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> >>>>---
> >>>>   drivers/vfio/Kconfig                |    6 +
> >>>>   drivers/vfio/Makefile               |    1 +
> >>>>   drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c |  247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>>>   include/linux/vfio.h                |   20 +++
> >>>>   4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
> >>>>   create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>>
> >>>>diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>>index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
> >>>>--- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>>+++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>>@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
> >>>>   	depends on VFIO
> >>>>   	default n
> >>>>
> >>>>+config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
> >>>>+	tristate
> >>>>+	depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
> >>>>+	default n
> >>>>+
> >>>>   menuconfig VFIO
> >>>>   	tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
> >>>>   	depends on IOMMU_API
> >>>>   	select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
> >>>>+	select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
> >>>>   	help
> >>>>   	  VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
> >>>>   	  See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
> >>>>diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>>index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
> >>>>--- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>>+++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>>@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
> >>>>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
> >>>>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
> >>>>+obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
> >>>>   obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
> >>>>diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>>new file mode 100644
> >>>>index 0000000..46a6298
> >>>>--- /dev/null
> >>>>+++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>>@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
> >>>>+/*
> >>>>+ * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
> >>>>+ *
> >>>>+ * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp.  All rights reserved.
> >>>>+ *     Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> >>>>+ *
> >>>>+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> >>>>+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> >>>>+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> >>>>+ *
> >>>>+ * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
> >>>>+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
> >>>>+ *     Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> >>>>+ */
> >>>>+
> >>>>+#include <linux/module.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/pci.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/slab.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/err.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/vfio.h>
> >>>>+#include <asm/iommu.h>
> >>>>+
> >>>>+#define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.1"
> >>>>+#define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "aik@ozlabs.ru"
> >>>>+#define DRIVER_DESC     "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >>>>+		struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+/*
> >>>>+ * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
> >>>>+ */
> >>>>+
> >>>>+/*
> >>>>+ * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
> >>>>+ * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
> >>>>+ * at the moment of initialization.
> >>>>+ */
> >>>>+struct tce_container {
> >>>>+	struct mutex lock;
> >>>>+	struct iommu_table *tbl;
> >>>>+};
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+	struct tce_container *container;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
> >>>>+		printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
> >>>>+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> >>>>+	}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
> >>>>+	if (!container)
> >>>>+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	mutex_init(&container->lock);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	return container;
> >>>>+}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);
> >>>
> >>>I think your patch ordering is backwards here.  it_group isn't added
> >>>until 2/2.  I'd really like to see the arch/powerpc code approved and
> >>>merged by the powerpc maintainer before we add the code that makes use
> >>>of it into vfio.  Otherwise we just get lots of churn if interfaces
> >>>change or they disapprove of it altogether.
> >>
> >>
> >>Makes sense, thanks.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>+	if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
> >>>>+		tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	kfree(container);
> >>>>+}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
> >>>>+				 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>>+	unsigned long minsz;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	switch (cmd) {
> >>>>+	case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
> >>>>+		return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
> >>>>+	}
> >>>>+	case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
> >>>>+		struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
> >>>>+		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>>+			return -ENXIO;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
> >>>>+				dma64_window_size);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>>+			return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (info.argsz < minsz)
> >>>>+			return -EINVAL;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >>>>+		info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >>>>+		info.dma64_window_start = 0;
> >>>>+		info.dma64_window_size = 0;
> >>>>+		info.flags = 0;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
> >>>>+			return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		return 0;
> >>>>+	}
> >>>>+	case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
> >>>>+		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
> >>>>+		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>>+		enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>>+			return -ENXIO;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>>+			return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >>>>+			return -EINVAL;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
> >>>>+				(param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
> >>>>+			direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
> >>>>+		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
> >>>>+			direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
> >>>>+		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
> >>>>+			direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
> >>>>+		}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >>>>+		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >>>
> >>>On x86 we force iova, vaddr, and size to all be aligned to the smallest
> >>>page granularity of the iommu and return -EINVAL if it doesn't fit.
> >>>What does it imply to the user if they're always aligned to work here?
> >>>Won't this interface happily map overlapping entries with no indication
> >>>to the user that the previous mapping is no longer valid?
> >>>Maybe another reason why a combined unmap/map makes me nervous, we have
> >>>to assume the user knows what they're doing.
> >>
> >>
> >>I got used to guests which do know what they are doing so I am pretty calm :)
> >>but ok, I'll move alignment to the QEMU, it makes sense.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >>>>+				param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
> >>>>+				param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >>>>+	}
> >>>>+	case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
> >>>>+		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
> >>>>+		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>>+			return -ENXIO;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>>+			return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >>>>+			return -EINVAL;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >>>>+		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >>>>+				0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >>>>+	}
> >>>>+	default:
> >>>>+		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);
> >>>
> >>>pr_warn
> >>>
> >>>>+	}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	return -ENOTTY;
> >>>>+}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >>>>+		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>>+	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	BUG_ON(!tbl);
> >>>>+	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
> >>>>+	pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
> >>>>+			iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
> >>>>+	if (container->tbl) {
> >>>>+		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",
> >>>
> >>>pr_warn
> >>>
> >>>>+				iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
> >>>>+				iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
> >>>>+		mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
> >>>>+		return -EBUSY;
> >>>>+	}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+	container->tbl = tbl;
> >>>
> >>>Would it be too much paranoia to clear all the tce here as you do below
> >>>on detach?
> >>
> >>Guess so. I do unmap on detach() and the guest calls put_tce(0) (i.e.
> >>unmaps) the whole DMA window at the boot time.
> >
> >But that's just one user of this interface, we can't assume they'll all
> >be so agreeable.  If any tces were enabled here, a malicious user would
> >have a window to host memory, right?  Thanks,
> 
> 
> But I still release pages on detach(), how can this code be not
> called on the guest exit (normal or crashed)?

I think the concern is about robustness if some bug elsewhere in the
kernel left some TCE entries in place before the table was handed over
to VFIO.
Alex Williamson Nov. 27, 2012, 5:07 a.m. UTC | #6
On Tue, 2012-11-27 at 15:58 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 27/11/12 15:29, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Tue, 2012-11-27 at 15:06 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >> On 27/11/12 05:20, Alex Williamson wrote:
> >>> On Fri, 2012-11-23 at 20:03 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >>>> VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
> >>>> a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
> >>>> or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.
> >>>>
> >>>> The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
> >>>> and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
> >>>> which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
> >>>> provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
> >>>> guest).
> >>>>
> >>>> The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.
> >>>>
> >>>> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> >>>> ---
> >>>>    drivers/vfio/Kconfig                |    6 +
> >>>>    drivers/vfio/Makefile               |    1 +
> >>>>    drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c |  247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>>>    include/linux/vfio.h                |   20 +++
> >>>>    4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
> >>>>    create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>> index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
> >>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>> @@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
> >>>>    	depends on VFIO
> >>>>    	default n
> >>>>
> >>>> +config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
> >>>> +	tristate
> >>>> +	depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
> >>>> +	default n
> >>>> +
> >>>>    menuconfig VFIO
> >>>>    	tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
> >>>>    	depends on IOMMU_API
> >>>>    	select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
> >>>> +	select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
> >>>>    	help
> >>>>    	  VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
> >>>>    	  See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
> >>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>> index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
> >>>> --- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>> @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
> >>>>    obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
> >>>>    obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
> >>>> +obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
> >>>>    obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
> >>>> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>> new file mode 100644
> >>>> index 0000000..46a6298
> >>>> --- /dev/null
> >>>> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>> @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
> >>>> +/*
> >>>> + * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
> >>>> + *
> >>>> + * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp.  All rights reserved.
> >>>> + *     Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> >>>> + *
> >>>> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> >>>> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> >>>> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> >>>> + *
> >>>> + * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
> >>>> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
> >>>> + *     Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> >>>> + */
> >>>> +
> >>>> +#include <linux/module.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/pci.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/err.h>
> >>>> +#include <linux/vfio.h>
> >>>> +#include <asm/iommu.h>
> >>>> +
> >>>> +#define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.1"
> >>>> +#define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "aik@ozlabs.ru"
> >>>> +#define DRIVER_DESC     "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
> >>>> +
> >>>> +static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >>>> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +/*
> >>>> + * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
> >>>> + */
> >>>> +
> >>>> +/*
> >>>> + * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
> >>>> + * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
> >>>> + * at the moment of initialization.
> >>>> + */
> >>>> +struct tce_container {
> >>>> +	struct mutex lock;
> >>>> +	struct iommu_table *tbl;
> >>>> +};
> >>>> +
> >>>> +static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +	struct tce_container *container;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
> >>>> +		printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
> >>>> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> >>>> +	}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
> >>>> +	if (!container)
> >>>> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	mutex_init(&container->lock);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	return container;
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);
> >>>
> >>> I think your patch ordering is backwards here.  it_group isn't added
> >>> until 2/2.  I'd really like to see the arch/powerpc code approved and
> >>> merged by the powerpc maintainer before we add the code that makes use
> >>> of it into vfio.  Otherwise we just get lots of churn if interfaces
> >>> change or they disapprove of it altogether.
> >>
> >>
> >> Makes sense, thanks.
> >>
> >>
> >>>> +	if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
> >>>> +		tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	kfree(container);
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
> >>>> +				 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>> +	unsigned long minsz;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	switch (cmd) {
> >>>> +	case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
> >>>> +		return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
> >>>> +	}
> >>>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
> >>>> +		struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
> >>>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>> +			return -ENXIO;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
> >>>> +				dma64_window_size);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>> +			return -EFAULT;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (info.argsz < minsz)
> >>>> +			return -EINVAL;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >>>> +		info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >>>> +		info.dma64_window_start = 0;
> >>>> +		info.dma64_window_size = 0;
> >>>> +		info.flags = 0;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
> >>>> +			return -EFAULT;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		return 0;
> >>>> +	}
> >>>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
> >>>> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
> >>>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>> +		enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>> +			return -ENXIO;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>> +			return -EFAULT;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >>>> +			return -EINVAL;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
> >>>> +				(param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
> >>>> +			direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
> >>>> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
> >>>> +			direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
> >>>> +		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
> >>>> +			direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
> >>>> +		}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >>>> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >>>
> >>> On x86 we force iova, vaddr, and size to all be aligned to the smallest
> >>> page granularity of the iommu and return -EINVAL if it doesn't fit.
> >>> What does it imply to the user if they're always aligned to work here?
> >>> Won't this interface happily map overlapping entries with no indication
> >>> to the user that the previous mapping is no longer valid?
> >>> Maybe another reason why a combined unmap/map makes me nervous, we have
> >>> to assume the user knows what they're doing.
> >>
> >>
> >> I got used to guests which do know what they are doing so I am pretty calm :)
> >> but ok, I'll move alignment to the QEMU, it makes sense.
> >>
> >>
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >>>> +				param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
> >>>> +				param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >>>> +	}
> >>>> +	case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
> >>>> +		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
> >>>> +		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>> +			return -ENXIO;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>> +			return -EFAULT;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >>>> +			return -EINVAL;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >>>> +		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >>>> +				0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >>>> +	}
> >>>> +	default:
> >>>> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);
> >>>
> >>> pr_warn
> >>>
> >>>> +	}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	return -ENOTTY;
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >>>> +		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>> +	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	BUG_ON(!tbl);
> >>>> +	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
> >>>> +	pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
> >>>> +			iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
> >>>> +	if (container->tbl) {
> >>>> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",
> >>>
> >>> pr_warn
> >>>
> >>>> +				iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
> >>>> +				iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
> >>>> +		mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
> >>>> +		return -EBUSY;
> >>>> +	}
> >>>> +
> >>>> +	container->tbl = tbl;
> >>>
> >>> Would it be too much paranoia to clear all the tce here as you do below
> >>> on detach?
> >>
> >> Guess so. I do unmap on detach() and the guest calls put_tce(0) (i.e.
> >> unmaps) the whole DMA window at the boot time.
> >
> > But that's just one user of this interface, we can't assume they'll all
> > be so agreeable.  If any tces were enabled here, a malicious user would
> > have a window to host memory, right?  Thanks,
> 
> 
> But I still release pages on detach(), how can this code be not called on 
> the guest exit (normal or crashed)?

What's the initial state?  You leave it clean, but who came before you?
Thanks,

Alex
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@  config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
 	depends on VFIO
 	default n
 
+config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
+	tristate
+	depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
+	default n
+
 menuconfig VFIO
 	tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
 	depends on IOMMU_API
 	select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
+	select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
 	help
 	  VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
 	  See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ 
 obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46a6298
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ 
+/*
+ * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp.  All rights reserved.
+ *     Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ *     Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/vfio.h>
+#include <asm/iommu.h>
+
+#define DRIVER_VERSION  "0.1"
+#define DRIVER_AUTHOR   "aik@ozlabs.ru"
+#define DRIVER_DESC     "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
+
+static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
+		struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
+
+/*
+ * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
+ * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
+ * at the moment of initialization.
+ */
+struct tce_container {
+	struct mutex lock;
+	struct iommu_table *tbl;
+};
+
+static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct tce_container *container;
+
+	if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!container)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	mutex_init(&container->lock);
+
+	return container;
+}
+
+static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
+{
+	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
+
+	WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);
+	if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
+		tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
+
+	mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
+
+	kfree(container);
+}
+
+static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
+				 unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
+	unsigned long minsz;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
+		return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
+	}
+	case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
+		struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
+		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
+
+		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
+			return -ENXIO;
+
+		minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
+				dma64_window_size);
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		if (info.argsz < minsz)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
+		info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
+		info.dma64_window_start = 0;
+		info.dma64_window_size = 0;
+		info.flags = 0;
+
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+	case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
+		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
+		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
+		enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
+
+		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
+			return -ENXIO;
+
+		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		if (param.argsz < minsz)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
+				(param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
+			direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
+		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
+			direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
+		} else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
+			direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
+		}
+
+		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
+		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
+				param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
+				param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
+	}
+	case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
+		vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
+		struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
+
+		if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
+			return -ENXIO;
+
+		minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&param, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		if (param.argsz < minsz)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
+		param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
+				0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
+	}
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);
+	}
+
+	return -ENOTTY;
+}
+
+static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
+		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
+{
+	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
+	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
+
+	BUG_ON(!tbl);
+	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
+	pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
+			iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
+	if (container->tbl) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",
+				iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
+				iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
+		mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	container->tbl = tbl;
+	mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
+		struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
+{
+	struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
+	struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
+
+	BUG_ON(!tbl);
+	mutex_lock(&container->lock);
+	if (tbl != container->tbl) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: detaching group #%u, expected group is #%u\n",
+				iommu_group_id(iommu_group),
+				iommu_group_id(tbl->it_group));
+	} else {
+
+		pr_debug("tce_vfio: detaching group #%u from iommu %p\n",
+				iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
+
+		iommu_put_tces(tbl, tbl->it_offset, 0, DMA_NONE, tbl->it_size);
+		container->tbl = NULL;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
+}
+
+const struct vfio_iommu_driver_ops tce_iommu_driver_ops = {
+	.name		= "iommu-vfio-powerpc",
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= tce_iommu_open,
+	.release	= tce_iommu_release,
+	.ioctl		= tce_iommu_ioctl,
+	.attach_group	= tce_iommu_attach_group,
+	.detach_group	= tce_iommu_detach_group,
+};
+
+static int __init tce_iommu_init(void)
+{
+	return vfio_register_iommu_driver(&tce_iommu_driver_ops);
+}
+
+static void __exit tce_iommu_cleanup(void)
+{
+	vfio_unregister_iommu_driver(&tce_iommu_driver_ops);
+}
+
+module_init(tce_iommu_init);
+module_exit(tce_iommu_cleanup);
+
+MODULE_VERSION(DRIVER_VERSION);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR(DRIVER_AUTHOR);
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DRIVER_DESC);
+
diff --git a/include/linux/vfio.h b/include/linux/vfio.h
index 0a4f180..3ecd65c 100644
--- a/include/linux/vfio.h
+++ b/include/linux/vfio.h
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@  extern void vfio_unregister_iommu_driver(
 /* Extensions */
 
 #define VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU		1
+#define VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU		2
 
 /*
  * The IOCTL interface is designed for extensibility by embedding the
@@ -442,4 +443,23 @@  struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_unmap {
 
 #define VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA _IO(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 14)
 
+/* -------- Additional API for SPAPR TCE (Server POWERPC) IOMMU -------- */
+
+struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info {
+	__u32 argsz;
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 dma32_window_start;
+	__u32 dma32_window_size;
+	__u64 dma64_window_start;
+	__u64 dma64_window_size;
+};
+
+#define VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO	_IO(VFIO_TYPE, VFIO_BASE + 12)
+
+/* Reuse type1 map/unmap structs as they are the same at the moment */
+typedef struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map;
+typedef struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_unmap vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap;
+
+/* ***************************************************************** */
+
 #endif /* VFIO_H */