| Message ID | 1300399132.1813.17.camel@emiko |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
On 03/17/2011 03:58 PM, Leann Ogasawara wrote: > The following changes since commit a03e8e64c82377c67d844a823e6a1ac673debc73: > Tavis Ormandy (1): > Revised [CVE-2010-4345 Karmic] install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check. CVE-2010-4346 > > are available in the git repository at: > > git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-karmic.git CVE-2010-4527 > > Dan Rosenberg (1): > sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527 > > sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++-- > 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > From 20c0067ab984fe024e594a2aa8429fa9a23c1001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com> > Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500 > Subject: [PATCH] sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527 > > CVE-2010-4527 > > BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/737073 > > The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by > unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to > a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't > guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible > to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array. > Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via > subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege > escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In > addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array. > > Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg<drosenberg@vsecurity.com> > Cc: stable<stable@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai<tiwai@suse.de> > (cherry picked from commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb) > > Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara<leann.ogasawara@canonical.com> > --- > sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++-- > 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c > index 61aaeda..31ee786 100644 > --- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c > +++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c > @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) > int i, n; > > for (i = 0; i< num_mixer_volumes; i++) { > - if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) { > + if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) { > if (present) > mixer_vols[i].num = i; > return mixer_vols[i].levels; > @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) > } > n = num_mixer_volumes++; > > - strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name); > + strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32); > > if (present) > mixer_vols[n].num = n; Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
On 03/17/2011 10:58 PM, Leann Ogasawara wrote: > The following changes since commit a03e8e64c82377c67d844a823e6a1ac673debc73: > Tavis Ormandy (1): > Revised [CVE-2010-4345 Karmic] install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check. CVE-2010-4346 > > are available in the git repository at: > > git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-karmic.git CVE-2010-4527 > > Dan Rosenberg (1): > sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527 > > sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++-- > 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > From 20c0067ab984fe024e594a2aa8429fa9a23c1001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> > Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500 > Subject: [PATCH] sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527 > > CVE-2010-4527 > > BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/737073 > > The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by > unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to > a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't > guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible > to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array. > Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via > subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege > escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In > addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array. > > Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> > Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> > (cherry picked from commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb) > > Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com> > --- > sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++-- > 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c > index 61aaeda..31ee786 100644 > --- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c > +++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c > @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) > int i, n; > > for (i = 0; i < num_mixer_volumes; i++) { > - if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) { > + if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) { > if (present) > mixer_vols[i].num = i; > return mixer_vols[i].levels; > @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) > } > n = num_mixer_volumes++; > > - strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name); > + strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32); > > if (present) > mixer_vols[n].num = n; Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Note, I won't apply this as the Karmic repos currently look like in the process of doing a release/upload.
applied
diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c index 61aaeda..31ee786 100644 --- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c +++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) int i, n; for (i = 0; i < num_mixer_volumes; i++) { - if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) { + if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) { if (present) mixer_vols[i].num = i; return mixer_vols[i].levels; @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) } n = num_mixer_volumes++; - strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name); + strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32); if (present) mixer_vols[n].num = n;
The following changes since commit a03e8e64c82377c67d844a823e6a1ac673debc73: Tavis Ormandy (1): Revised [CVE-2010-4345 Karmic] install_special_mapping skips security_file_mmap check. CVE-2010-4346 are available in the git repository at: git://kernel.ubuntu.com/ogasawara/ubuntu-karmic.git CVE-2010-4527 Dan Rosenberg (1): sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527 sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) From 20c0067ab984fe024e594a2aa8429fa9a23c1001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes, CVE-2010-4527 CVE-2010-4527 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/737073 The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array. Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> (cherry picked from commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb) Signed-off-by: Leann Ogasawara <leann.ogasawara@canonical.com> --- sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)